







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 







Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 




























Submitted to the University of Warwick
for the degree of







Chapter 1 An Overview of the Thesis 1
Chapter 2 Classical Optimal Stopping Problem 6
2.1 All stopping times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Under finite stopping times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chapter 3 Cautious Stochastic Choice, Optimal Stopping and Delib-
erate Randomisation 12
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 CSC model in a static setting (Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2017)) . . . . . 14
3.4 The Optimal stopping models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4.1 Optimal stopping under expected utility . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4.2 Optimal stopping under Cautious Stochastic Choice . . . . . 20
3.5 A stylized example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5.1 Pure threshold strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.2 Improvement with randomisation between Two Upper Thresh-
olds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.3 The Optimal Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.5.4 A Generalized Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6 Two realistic models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.6.1 An example with S-shaped reference dependent utilities . . . 35
3.6.2 An example based on concave utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
i
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Chapter 4 Optimal Stopping and the Sufficiency of Randomised Thresh-
old Strategies 43
4.1 Introduction and main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Problem specification and the problem in natural scale . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Characterizing the possible laws of the stopped process in natural scale 46
4.4 Sufficiency of mixed threshold rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4.1 An example - Rank dependent utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.5 Sufficient conditions for the optimality of pure threshold rules . . . . 50
4.6 Extension to other state spaces for the process in natural scale . . . 52
4.6.1 The range is unbounded below but bounded above . . . . . . 52
4.6.2 The range is bounded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.6.3 The range is unbounded above and below . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Chapter 5 Randomising Rules for Stopping Problems 55
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2 Problem Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 The base case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.4 Linear payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4.1 Perceived continuation value c = w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4.2 Perceived continuation value c = h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4.3 Perceived continuation value c = G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.5 Call payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.5.1 Explicit formula for h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.5.2 Perceived continuation value c = w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.5.3 Perceived continuation value c = h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.5.4 Perceived continuation value c = G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5.5 Comparison of the different solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5.6 Realised rate of stopping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.6 Towards a model of continuous stopping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.6.1 Modification of the randomising stopping rule . . . . . . . . . 75
5.6.2 Making ξ dependent on λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.6.3 Alternative formulation of the limiting case . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
ii
Chapter 6 Constrained Optimal Stopping, Liquidity and Effort 85
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2 The set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.2.1 Some results for classical problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.3 Cost functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.4 Quadratic cost functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.4.1 Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.4.2 First Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.4.3 Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.5 Concave cost functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5.1 An example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.6 Numerical analysis on further examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.6.1 Addition of a linear cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.6.2 Quadratic costs with positive fixed cost . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.6.3 Cost functions defined on a subset of R+ . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
iii
Acknowledgments
I must first express my utmost gratitude to my supervisors David Hobson and Vicky
Henderson for their excellent guidance during my PhD study. Apart from obtaining
excellent academic advice, I also received invaluable support and encouragement
over the past few years, which have been the crucial input into my professional de-
velopment.
I also wish to acknowledge the financial support from a Chancellor’s International
Scholarship offered by Warwick, which made my study here possible.
Care from friends is unmatched. I would like to mention some who have played an
important part in three years: Kaiye, Haodong, Shuo, Dominic, Jonathan, Takumi,
Isabel, Chris.
My special thanks go to my parents for their unconditional love.
iv
Declarations
This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has
not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. Work based on
collaborative research is declared as follows:
Chapter 3 is a joint work with Vicky Henderson and David Hobson based on the
paper ”Cautious Stochastic Choice, Optimal Stopping, and Deliberated Randomi-
sation”, available on SSRN 3118906
Chapter 4 is a joint work with Vicky Henderson and David Hobson based on the
paper ”Optimal Stopping and the Sufficiency of Randomised Threshold Strategies”,
available on arXiv:1708.01038
Chapter 5 is a joint work with David Hobson based on the paper ”Randomising
Rules for Stopping Problems”
Chapter 6 is a joint work with David Hobson based on the paper ”Constrained
Optimal Stopping, Liquidity, and Effort”, available on arXiv:1901.07270
Work conducted exclusively by myself is declared as follows:
• Chapter 2
• Chapter 3.3, Chapter 3.5.1, Chapter 3.5.2, Chapter 3.6
• Chapter 5.4, Chapter 5.5, Chapter 5.6.1, Chapter 5.6.2
• Chapter 6.3, Chapter 6.5, Chapter 6.6
v
Abstract
This thesis is a collection of four individual works on optimal stopping problems
in junction with stochastic behaviours. Chapter 2 introduces the classical opti-
mal stopping problem. In the classical model, the optimal strategy is to stop at
some predetermined threshold, and thus there is no stochastic behaviours involved.
Chapter 3 established a dynamic Cautious Stochastic Choice (CSC) model for an
optimal stopping problem. Randomised strategies outperform threshold strategies
in the CSC model, and thus, stochastic behaviours are predicted by our CSC model.
Chapter 4 discussed the sufficiency of randomised threshold strategies and pointed
out that the desire of stochastic behaviours stems from quasi-convexity. Chapter 5
considered a stopping problem where the agent doesn’t stop with probability one.
Instead, the stopping probability depends on the relative values of stopping and
continuing. We discussed the case where stopping opportunities are constrained to
be event times of an independent Poisson process. Dupuis and Wang introduced
constraint on the class of admissible stopping times which they had to take values in
the set of event times of an exogenous, time-homogeneous Poisson process. Chapter
6 extended the analysis of Dupuis and Wang (2005) to allow the agent to choose the
rate of the Poisson process. Even for a simple model for the stopped process and
a simple call-style payoff, the problem leads to a rich range of optimal behaviours
which depend on the form of the cost function.
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Chapter 1
An Overview of the Thesis
Stopping problems are often used to model dynamic decision-making tasks, such
as option pricing, irreversible investment, market entry and job search, and are
widely applied in finance, economics and statistics. Consider the classical optimal
stopping problem. Let the asset price process X = (Xt)t≥0 be a time-homogeneous,
continuous, real-valued, strong-Markov process with initial value X0 = x, living on
a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F = {Ft}) which satisfies the usual conditions.
Let g : R 7→ R+ be a (measurable) payoff function (satisfying suitable growth
conditions, so that the problem is well-posed) and let β be a strictly positive discount
factor. The value function w = w(x) of the classical discounted optimal stopping




where T is the set of all F−stopping times and Ex denotes the expectation condition-
ing on the initial state X0 = x. In this paradigm, at each instant the agent makes
a choice between stopping (and receiving an instantaneous payoff) and continuing
(and receiving a discounted payoff in the future). Under optimising behaviour, the
agent will stop if the stopping value is at least as large as the continuation value.
One way to characterise w is via the variational inequality min{βw−Lw,w−g} = 0
where L = LX is the infinitesimal generator of X. Typically, the optimal strategies
are of threshold form (i.e. the stopping time is the first time the underlying process
reaches some set).




= µdt+ σdWt; X0 = x (1.2)
where µ and σ are positive constants. Then X has generator L = LX given by
1
Lf = 12x
2σ2f ′′ + µxf ′. And let g be an American call option given by
g(x) = (x−K)+. (1.3)
The optimal stopping time in this case is of threshold type (i.e. stop as soon as the
underlying process is above some predetermined level). More precisely, the optimal
stopping time is given by (see Chapter 2 for more details)
τL∗ = inf{t > 0;Xt ≥ L∗}













The stopping time τL∗ is called a threshold strategy and it implies that if the agent
is asked to choose an exercising price level for the same option multiple times, he
always stops at the optimal threshold L∗ given x ≤ L∗ (for x ≥ L∗, stopping is imme-
diate). Unfortunately, this form of predicted behaviours from this classical optimal
stopping problem does not match the observed behaviours in the financial markets
where investors are seen to sell identical assets at different price levels. Furthermore,
the phenomenon of stochastic choice has been consistently recorded by experimen-
tal studies. When subjects are asked to choose from the same set of options many
times, they are inconsistent in their choices. Patterns of stochastic choice were
first recorded by Tversky (1969) and many studies have replicated, explored and ex-
tended his results (see Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) for recent findings and a compre-
hensive overview, and amongst others Dwenger et al (2013), Hey and Orme (1994)).
Hence, this thesis goes beyond the classical optimal stopping paradigm and builds
dynamic, continuous-time models in which stochastic behaviours can be captured.
There is a large body of theoretical models which were developed to capture the
phenomenon of stochastic or random choice. Cautious Stochastic Choice (CSC)
falls into the class of stochastic models postulating that stochasticity is a deliberate
choice of the agent.1 Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2017) develop a theory of Cautious
Stochastic Choice, showing that CSC agents may benefit from randomising in a
static decision making setting. There are fewer models capturing the phenomenon
of stochastic choice in the dynamic setting of a stopping problem. Chapter 3 of
this thesis considers agents who face optimal timing decisions in a dynamic setting
and who exhibit cautious stochastic choice. The CSC agent is unsure which utility
1There are two other main classes of models of stochastic choice. In random utility models,
subjects maximise a well defined utility function but this changes stochastically over time (eg. Gul
and Pesendorfer (2006)). In models of bounded rationality, agents have well defined and stable
preferences but may not make the best choice because of bounded rationality (see Johnson and
Ratcliff (2013) for a review).
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function to use from a family of possibilities W and applies caution to choose the
worst-case certainty equivalent. For a fixed stopping time τ and a fixed utility
u ∈ W, we define the corresponding certainty equivalent as Cuτ = u−1(E[u(Xτ )]).
The CSC value for a single stopping time τ is Vτ = infu∈W C
u
τ . Under CSC the
optimal stopping problem is to find V (S) = supτ∈S Vτ , that is





where S is a set of stopping times. The optimal stopping rule is the one which
maximises the CSC value. Our main result is that CSC agents may have an optimal
strategy which is not of threshold form and may involve randomisation. Randomi-
sation in this case is deliberate, being an optimal result derived from the dynamic
CSC setting.
In light of the insufficiency of threshold strategies, in Chapter 4 we conduct in-
vestigations in the sufficiency of randomised threshold strategies (i.e. stopping rules
which are based on the first exit from a randomly chosen interval). Our main result
is that: for problems in which the value associated to a stopping rule depends on the
law of the stopped process, if this value is quasi-convex on the space of attainable
laws then it is sufficient to restrict attention to the class of threshold strategies which
involves no randomisation; however, if the objective function is not quasi-convex,
this may not be the case. We show that, nonetheless, it is sufficient to restrict
attention to mixtures of threshold strategies.
The fact that quasi-convexity means that there is no benefit from following ran-
domised strategies is well understood in the economics literature, see Machina (1985)
Camerer and Ho (1994), Wakker (2010) and He et al (2017). Recently there has
been a surge of interest in problems which, whilst they have the law invariance
property, do not satisfy the quasi-convex criterion. Our dynamic CSC model is
one example whose value function does not satisfy quasi-convex criterion. Also, the
CSC value of a stopping rule depends only on the law of Xτ . By our main result, in
searching for an optimal stopping rule for (1.4), it is sufficient to restrict attention
to randomised threshold rules. By considering both stylised and realistic models
in dynamic CSC setting, we can show randomised threshold strategies outperform
cut-off or threshold strategies.
Apart from the non-quasi-convexity of the value function, stochastic behaviour
can also stem from the stopping probability. In Chapter 5, we build a dynamic,
continuous-time model of stopping in which the probability of stopping is not zero-
one. Instead the probability of stopping depends on the relative values of the imme-
3
diate receipts g and the perceived continuation value c (i.e. the stopping probability
at any decision point is given by p = gg+c ). We call this a randomised stopping rule.
In contrast to Chapter 3, randomisation is engineered into the setup of randomising
stopping rule instead of being an optimal result.
One immediate issue of this randomised stopping rule is that if at each instant an
agent has a positive probability of stopping, then since in a continuous-time model
there are an uncountable number of stopping opportunities in any small interval, the
agent will end up stopping immediately. To deal with this issue, we constrain the
agent to stopping at a countable number of times, namely the event times {T λn }n≥1
of an independent Poisson process of rate λ. Optimal stopping problems in which
stopping is only possible at event times of a Poisson process have been studied
previously by Dupuis and Wang (2005). The value function for an optimal stopping
problem with such constraints is given by
h(x) = hλ(x) = sup
τ∈T λ
Ex[e−βτg(Xτ )] (1.5)
where T λ is the set of all stopping times taking values in the event times of the
Poisson process. Let T̂ λ0 be the set of stopping times taking values in {0}∪{T λn }n≥1.
Let V λ,h
λ
= V h be the value of the optimal stopping problem, conditional on there
being an event of the Poisson process at time 0. Then we have
V h(x) = sup
τ∈T̂ λ0
Ex[e−βτg(Xτ )] = max{g(x), h(x)}. (1.6)














Chapter 5 considers the stopping problem where stopping can only occur at event
times of a Poisson process, but in contrast to an optimal stopping problem where
stopping probability is either zero or one, the probability of stopping under the
randomising stopping rule depends on the value of immediate stopping g = g(Xt)
and on the perceived continuation value c = c(Xt). More precisely, we suppose there
4
is a map Γ : R+ × R+ 7→ [0, 1] such that the probability of stopping at time t is
p(Xt) = Γ(g(Xt), c(Xt)).
Integrating against the time of the first event of the Poisson process, and by analogy







where V Γ is the value function conditional on there being an event of the Poisson
process at time zero. Using the randomising stopping rule Γ, we get
V Γ = Γ(g, c)g + (1− Γ(g, c))G.
In Chapter 6, we extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang (2005) to allow the
agent to choose the rate of the Poisson process Λ = (Λt)t≥0 . Also, some cost is
incurred per unit time : Ct = C(Λt).
In this paradigm, the agent has two problems to solve. Firstly, for a given a rate
of the Poisson process he needs to find the optimal stopping strategy. In analogy to











Secondly, the agents needs to work out the optimal control on the rate of the Poisson




where A is the admissible control space.
We interpret the rate of the Poisson process Λ = (Λt)t≥0 as an indicator of how
much effort the agent spends on searching for stopping opportunities. The harder
the agent works, the larger the rate of the Poisson process gets. Our focus is on the
case where X is an exponential Brownian motion, but the general case of a regular,
time-homogeneous diffusion can be reduced to this case at the expense of slightly
more complicated technical conditions. We begin by rigorously stating the form
of the problem we will study. Then we proceed to solve for the effort process and
stopping rule in (6.1). It turns out that there are two distinctive cases depending







2.1 All stopping times
In this section we keep the setups defined by (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3). Moreover, we
require limt→∞ Ex[e−βtg(Xt)] = 0 so that the problem is well defined for infinite
stopping times. Using that fact that g(x) ≤ x and the properties of geometric








Thus, if we assume that µ < β, it follows that limt→∞ Ex[e−βtg(Xt)] = 0. We
characterise w via the variational inequality min{βw−Lw,w− g} = 0 where Lf =
1
2x
2σ2f ′′ + µxf ′. The optimal stopping time in this case is conjectured to be a
threshold type stopping rule (i.e. stop as soon as the underlying process is above
some predetermined level). By (1.3), we know that it’s better to continue when X
is small. Therefore, we assume (and prove later) that the optimal stopping time is
τL = inf{t > 0;Xt ≥ L} (2.1)
Under this stopping rule, the state space is divided into a stopping region S = [L,∞)
and a continuation region C = (0, L). Denote by vL the value of the option under
strategy τL. On stopping region S, vL satisfies
vL = g (2.2)
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On continuation region C, vL satisfies
LvL − βvL = 0 (2.3)



































Since we require vL(0) = 0, A0 must be 0. Moreover, vL is continuous at x = L.
Thus, we have
ALθ = L−K
which gives A = L−K
Lθ







(L−K), x < L
(x−K)+, x ≥ L
.










the optimal threshold L∗ satisfies
L∗ −K
(L∗)θ
θ(L∗)θ−1 = 1 (2.6)
and hence L∗ = θθ−1KA∗ = (L∗)1−θθ (2.7)
It follows that under the optimal threshold L∗, the value function v for the call
option is given by






θ, x ∈ (0, θθ−1K)
(x−K)+, x ∈ [ θθ−1K,∞)
(2.8)
Note that 0 ≤ v′(x) ≤ 1 and v(x) ≤ x.
Theorem 1. Suppose the underlying process is a geometric Brownian motion de-
fined in (1.2) and let v be given by (2.8). Then v = w where w is given by (1.1)
and hence is the price of a perpetual American call option g defined in (1.3) ; the
7
stopping time τL defined in (2.1) for L = L
∗ is optimal.
Proof. (a) First we prove that v provides an upper bound for the value of this
call option (1.1). For fixed T > 0 and for every stopping time τ ∈ T , applying Itô’s
formula to e−βtv(Xt) between 0 and τ ∧ T we have




























2β − 2µ− σ2
<∞. (2.9)
Thus, the stopped stochastic integral is a true martingale. Taking expectation on











Since the transition density of X is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue







Since v ≥ 0, we apply Fatou’s lemma and obtain,




























(b) Next, we want to show that v is a lower bound for this call option value (1.1).
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For fixed T > 0, applying Itô’s formula to e−βtv(Xt) between 0 and τL∗ ∧T we have









Similar to (2.9) we can show that the stopped stochastic integral part is a true
martingale. Moreover, we have that Lv−βv = 0 for any x ∈ (0, L∗). It follows that∫ τL∗∧T
0
e−βt(Lv − βv)(Xt)dt = 0.



































We also notice that
e−βτL∗g(XτL∗ )I{τL∗=∞} = lim sup
t→∞















Combining (2.10) and (2.12), it completes the proof.
Remark 1. It is evident from the definition of τL and the fact X is a geometric
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Brownian motion that τL is not always finite. Using the well-known Doob formula














for a and b positive. It is straightforward to verify that
Px(τL <∞) = Px(sup
t≥0
Xt ≥ L) =
1 if 2µ ≥ σ2 or x ∈ [L,∞)( x
L
)1−2µ/σ2
if 2µ ≤ σ2 and x ∈ (0, L)
.
Remark 2. First, let’s consider the case where β < µ. The requirement
limt→∞ Ex[e−βtg(Xt)] = 0 is not satisfied in this case. It is easy to see that w(x) =
∞ for all x > 0. Indeed, in this case, from the explicit expression of the geometric






and by sending T to infinity, we get the announced result. In this case, the underlying
price process grows faster enough to compensate the loss from discounting. As a
result, it’s never optimal to stop.
For the case β = µ, we have w(x) = x. Indeed, for any stopping time τ , for any


































Conversely, from (2.13), by taking τ = n, we have
w(x) ≥ x−Ke−βn
and so by sending n to infinity, we obtain
w(x) ≥ x.
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Therefore, w(x) = x as announced. And, it’s never optimal to stop in the case
β = µ.
2.2 Under finite stopping times
Denote by TF the set of all finite stopping times (i.e. for any τ ∈ TF , P(τ <∞) = 1).
In this section, we look for optimal stopping times in TF instead of searching over




where X and g are defined by (1.2) and (1.3) respectively, and β > µ is the dis-
counting factor. Analogously, we have the following theorem
Theorem 2. Suppose the underlying process is a geometric Brownian motion de-
fined in (1.2) and let v be given by (2.8). Then v solves (2.14) and hence is the
price of a perpetual American call option g defined in (1.3) ; if P(τL∗ <∞) = 1, the
stopping time τL defined in (2.1) for L = L
∗ is optimal.
Proof. (a) First we want to show that v is an upper bound for (2.14). Since u is
the value function derived from a smaller set of stopping times than w, clearly, we
have
v(x) = w(x) ≥ u(x).
(b). Next we want to show that v is a lower bound for (2.14). It’s similar to part

























































It is well recognized that individual decision making is not fully captured by expected
utility theory and many non-expected utility theories have been developed with the
aim of providing a better fit to observed behaviour. Many of these alternative
theories have been well studied in a static setting, but recently there has been
much interest in studying non-expected utility preferences in dynamic settings which
describe timing problems arising in real world decisions. Examples of theoretical
work in this vein include Ebert and Strack (2015) and in experimental settings,
Oprea et al (2009). This section considers agents who face optimal timing decisions
in a dynamic setting and who exhibit cautious stochastic choice (CSC).
Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2015), (2017) (see also Maccheroni (2002)) develop a theory
of cautious stochastic choice in a static decision making setting. The agent aims
to select a best lottery from a given set. Under CSC the agent has a family of
possible utility functions in mind. For a given lottery, and for each utility, the
agent computes the certainty equivalent. The agent then values the lottery via the
worst-case certainty equivalent. Finally the agent chooses the best lottery which
maximizes this value. Since CSC does not satisfy the quasi-convexity property (See
Chapter 4, (4.2) for definition), agents may benefit from mixing (see Cerreia-Vioglio
et al (2017)). Our goal is to ask if these results from a static setting also apply
in an optimal stopping problem. We want to understand if CSC agents also seek
12
to randomise in a dynamic setting. In this section we consider a continuous time
optimal stopping model for the sale of an asset in which the price process is given
by a one-dimensional time-homogeneous diffusion. If the agent were an expected
utility maximizer, it is well known that the optimal stopping rule is given by the
first exit time of the price process from an interval, ie. a pure threshold strategy.
We formulate an optimal stopping problem with CSC as follows. The agent has
a family of utility functions and for a given stopping rule (in an appropriate class
of admissible strategies), for each utility, computes the cerainty equivalent. The
worst-case is then taken over utilities. The goal is to find the stopping rule which
maximizes the worst-case certainty equivalent value.
By considering a stylized but tractable example, we can show the optimal strategy
is not necessarily of threshold form. For this example we can calculate the optimal
stopping rule and show that it is a non-trivial mixture of threshold strategies. We
then consider two realistic models where the asset price follows exponential Brownian
motion. In the first model the family of utilities are S-shaped and reference level
dependent. The second model uses a family of concave utility functions. These
examples show CSC agents do randomise in realistic, dynamic optimal stopping
settings.
3.2 Literature
A consistent finding in experimental studies of individual decision making is the phe-
nomenon of stochastic or random choice. When subjects are asked to choose from
the same set of options many times, they are inconsistent in their choices. Patterns of
stochastic choice were first recorded by Tversky (1969) and many studies have repli-
cated, explored and extended his results (see Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) for recent
findings and a comprehensive overview, and amongst others Dwenger et al (2013),
Hey and Orme (1994)). In particular, recent studies of Agranov and Ortoleva (2017)
and Dwenger et al (2013) interpret their experimental results as suggesting the main
force is a deliberate desire of participants to randomise. Much of this evidence is
gathered in static settings. Recently, researchers have studied dynamic settings
which can better reflect the real decision making situations individuals face in eco-
nomics and finance (eg. Oprea et al (2009)). Strack and Viefers (2017) conduct an
experiment in a sophisticated asset selling task whereby subjects played sixty-five
rounds during which they could sell their stock. In each round they observe a path of
the market price which follows a random walk with positive expected return. Strack
and Viefers (2017) present evidence that players do not play cut-off or threshold
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strategies over gains - they do not behave time-consistently within rounds 75% of
the time, and visit the same price level three times on average before stopping at
it. In contrast to the behaviour of an EU agent, our CSC agent does not only use
pure threshold strategies and instead prefers mixed or randomised strategies, consis-
tent with this body of recent evidence. The CSC agent is deliberately randomizing,
which is again, in line with the recent experimental findings as described above.
There is a large body of theoretical models which were developed to capture the
phenomenon of stochastic or random choice. CSC falls into the class of stochastic
models postulating that stochasticity is a deliberate choice of the agent.1 Deliberate
randomisation (Machina (1985)) emerges in non-EU settings such as prospect the-
ory (see Wakker (2010) in a static setting, and Henderson, Hobson and Tse (2017)
and He et al (2017) in dynamic setups). There are fewer models capturing the phe-
nomenon of stochastic choice in the dynamic setting of a stopping problem. Strack
and Viefers (2017) combine random utility with regret preferences in a stopping
context. Henderson, Hobson and Tse (2017) and He et al (2017) show randomised
strategies are optimal in a stopping model with prospect theory preferences. The
largest class of stopping models are the bounded rationality Drift Diffusion models
(DDM) of which the work of Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki (2017) is a recent
example. Our CSC model contributes a new dynamic optimal stopping model to
this class of stochastic choice models in the literature.
3.3 CSC model in a static setting (Cerreia-Vioglio et
al (2017))
In this section, we present the CSC model in a static setting and give a mixing result
of Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2017).
We first establish notation and review the theory for the optimal liquidation of
an asset in the classical setting of a maximizer of expected utility. For J an interval
subset of R, let F J↑ be the set of increasing functions F J↑ = {f : J 7→ R; f increasing}.
For f ∈ F J↑ we can define the left-continuous inverse f−1. For K a subset of Rd let
P(K) be the set of Borel probability measures on K.
Consider an interval I ⊆ R of possible monetary prizes. Let ∆ = {ν : ν ∈ P(I)}
be the set of lotteries over I and let Q be a subset of ∆. The agent has a set of
1There are two other main classes of models of stochastic choice. In random utility models,
subjects maximize a well defined utility function but this changes stochastically over time (eg. Gul
and Pesendorfer (2006)). In models of bounded rationality, agents have well defined and stable
preferences but may not make the best choice because of bounded rationality (see Johnson and
Ratcliff (2013) for a review).
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utility functions W ⊆ F I↑ . Given a lottery q ∈ Q and a utility u ∈ W, we denote by
Eq(u) the expected utility of u with respect to q, that is Eq(u) =
∫
I u(x)q(dx). The
certainty equivalent of q with respect to u is defined as
Cuq = u
−1(Eq(u)). (3.1)
Under the CSC paradigm of Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2015, 2017) (see also earlier
work of Maccheroni (2002)) the agent chooses a best lottery from Q by displaying
cautious behaviour: the evaluation for any given lottery q ∈ Q is determined by V q =
minu∈W C
u
q ; the optimal strategy is to choose the lottery q̄ ∈ Q which maximizes V q.
This involves both minimization and maximization steps. Note that typically I, Q
and W are taken to be compact so that the optimizers exist.
Now we want to allow the agent to mix over lotteries. Let co(Q) denote the
convex hull of Q. Then ρ = ρλ ∈ co(A), represents a compound lottery obtained
through a randomisation λ ∈ P(Q). If λ is a discrete distribution over q ∈ Q
we have ρλ =
∑
λiqi; more generally, ρ
λ =
∫
Q λ(dq)q is a measure on I given
by ρλ(dx) =
∫
Q λ(dq)q(dx). For a lottery ρ
λ ∈ co(Q) we can define the expected















. Then an optimal randomised lottery is given by





In this static setting, Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2017) show that mixing over two
lotteries may improve the worst case certainty equivalent.
Suppose Q = {p, q} and W = {u, v}. If for an arbitrary constant K > 0, we have
Cup > K > C
v
p
Cuq < K < C
v
q
then, a linear combination of p and q is better than any one of them in terms of
smallest certainty equivalent. To see this, note that for λ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ = ρλ =
λp+ (1− λ)q
Eρ(u) = λEp(u)+(1−λ)Eq(u) = λu(Cup )+(1−λ)u(Cuq ) > λu(K)+(1−λ)u(Cuq ) > u(Cuq )
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and since u is strictly increasing, it follows that
u−1(Eρ(u)) > u−1(u(Cuq )) = Cuq .
A similar argument gives that v−1(Eρ(v)) > Cvp . Then
min
w∈W





It follows that in a static setting it can be optimal to take a mixed strategy.
3.4 The Optimal stopping models
Let L(Z) denote the law of a random variable Z. If Y = (Yt)t≥0 is a stochastic
process and S is a class of stopping times then let QY (S) = {L(Yτ ); τ ∈ S}. Let δy
be the point mass at y.
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P). Let Y = (Yt)t≥0 be
a (F,P)-stochastic process on this probability space. Let IY be the state space of Y
and let ĪY be the closure of IY . We suppose that Y is a regular, time-homogeneous
diffusion with initial value Y0 = y which lies in the interior of I
Y . Further we
suppose that limt↑∞ Yt exists. A sufficient condition for this is Assumption 1 below.
Y represents the price process of the asset.
3.4.1 Optimal stopping under expected utility
Let U be an increasing utility function, U ∈ F ĪY↑ . For a maximizer of expected
utility the objective is to find the certainty equivalent
CEU (S) = sup
τ∈S







over a suitable class S of stopping times. We introduce three classes of stopping
times
• T , the class of all stopping times;
• TT , the class of (pure) threshold stopping times;
• TR, the class of randomised threshold stopping times.
The set of pure threshold stopping times includes stopping immediately and can be
written as
TT = ∪(β,γ)∈D{τYβ,γ}, (3.3)
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where τYβ,γ = infu≥0{u : Yu /∈ (β, γ)} and the union is taken over (β, γ) in an
appropriate set DY ⊆ ([−∞, y] ∩ ĪY )× ([y,∞] ∩ ĪY ) which we describe below.
In order to be able to define the set of randomised threshold stopping times TR
we suppose that F0 is rich enough as to support any probability measure η on D,
and that the dynamics of Y are independent of η. Then we define a randomised
stopping time τη by
τη = inf
u≥0
{u : Yu /∈ (Θβ,Θγ) where Θ = (Θβ,Θγ) is F0 measurable and has law η}
and set
TR = {τη; η ∈ P(D)}. (3.4)
Note that TT ⊂ TR ⊂ T .
Often, the best way to solve (3.2) is via a change of scale. Let s be a strictly
increasing function such that X = s(Y ) is a local martingale. Such a function s
exists under very mild conditions on Y (see Rogers and Williams (2000)), and is
called a scale function. For example, if Y solves the SDE dYt = σ(Yt)dBt + µ(Yt)dt
then s = s(z) is a solution to 12σ(z)
2s′′ + µ(z)s′ = 0. Note that if s is a scale
function then so is any affine transformation of s and so we may chose any convenient
normalization for s. Then U(Yτ ) = g(Xτ ) where g = U ◦ s−1 and (3.2) can be
rewritten as
CEU (S) = sup
τ∈S







where x = s(y). Since the scale function s is fixed, in finding the optimal stopping
rule it is sufficient to consider supτ∈S g
−1(Ex[g(Xτ )]). The state space of X is
IX = s(IY ). Then ĪX = s(ĪY ). If IX is not bounded below then for any level γ
in the interior of IX with γ ≥ x the first hitting time HXγ = infu≥0{u : Xu = γ} is
finite almost surely and CEU (T ) = supγ∈IX U−1g(γ) = sup{γ : γ ∈ IY } = max{γ :
γ ∈ ĪY }. We want to exclude this degenerate case. Hence we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. IX = s(IY ) is bounded below. Then, without loss of generality we
may assume that the lower limit of IX is zero. Any accessible boundary point for X
is absorbing.
The upper limit of IX may be finite or infinite. Note that since X is a non-
negative local martingale limt↑∞Xt exists and hence limt↑∞ Yt exists. We do not
exclude τ such that P(τ =∞) > 0 and on the set τ =∞ we define Xτ = limt↑∞Xt.
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This is why we want to consider ĪX as well as IX . Then T is the set of all stopping
times, and not just finite stopping times.
Example 1. Suppose Y is geometric Brownian motion: dYt = σYtdBt+µYtdt, Y0 =
y. Let ψ = 1 − 2µ
σ2
. Y has state space IY = (0,∞). Provided ψ 6= 0 we have
s(z) = sgn(ψ)zψ. (If ψ = 0 then s(z) = ln z is the scale function.) If ψ ≤ 0 then
s(0) = −∞. This is equivalent to 2µ ≥ σ2, in which case Y hits arbitrarily high
price levels with probability one and the optimal stopping problem is degenerate. If
ψ > 0 then IX = (0,∞). For ψ > 0, limt→∞Xt = 0 ∈ ĪX \IX . Moreover, fix y > 0,
and for an arbitrary constant b > y, we have
Py(τb <∞) = lim
n↑∞









Therefore, geometric Brownian motion can produce non-trivial examples.
Remark 3. Under Assumption 1 the process X is a non-negative local martingale,
and hence a supermartingale. Further, for any stopping time Ex[Xτ ] ≤ x. If IX
is bounded above then X is a martingale and Ex[Xτ ] = x, but for many examples
IX = (0,∞) or [0,∞) and then there exist τ for which Ex[Xτ ] < x.
We do not make a concavity assumption on U . Monotonicity is preserved under
the transformation U 7→ g, but in general concavity is not. Indeed, if g is concave
then typically stopping immediately (τ = 0) is optimal (see Figure 3.1).
Note that τYβ,γ = infu≥0{u : Yu /∈ (β, γ)} = infu≥0{u : Xu /∈ (s(β), s(γ))} =:
τXs(β),s(γ). Hence TT has the alternative representation
TT = ∪(a,b)∈DX{τXa,b},
for an appropriate set DX . The right space to choose is DX = ([0, x]∩ ĪX)×([x,∞]∩
ĪX). Then DY can be expressed as
DY = [s−1(0), y)× [y, s−1(∞)]
TR can also be rewritten as TR = {τXη : η ∈ P(DX)} where
τXη = inf
u≥0
{u : Xu /∈ (Θβ,Θγ)where Θ = (Θβ,Θγ) is F0 measurable and has law η}
Recall QX(S) is the set of possible laws of the stopped X-process, over stopping
times in S. We have the following lemma.
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Figure 3.1: For concave function g and any stopping time τa,b, the expected payoff
is V1; V2 is the payoff from stopping immediately. V2 ≥ V1.
Lemma 1. 1. If IX is bounded then QX(T ) = {L(Xτ ) : τ ∈ T } = {ν ∈ P(ĪX) :∫
ĪX zν(dz) = x}. If I
X is not bounded above then QX(T ) = {L(Xτ ) : τ ∈
T } = {ν ∈ P(ĪX) :
∫
ĪX zν(dz) ≤ x}.
















3. In both cases QX(TT ) ⊂ QX(TR) = QX(T ).
Proof. 1. Suppose IX is unbounded. The fact that QX(T ) ⊆ {ν ∈ P(ĪX) :∫
ĪX zν(dz) ≤ x} follows from Remark 3. The fact that we have equality follows
from the fact that by Skorokhod’s Embedding Theorem any ν ∈ P([0,∞)) with∫
zν(dz) ≤ x can be obtained as the law of Xτ for a stopping time τ . See Pedersen
and Peskir (2001) or Cox and Hobson (2004). The case of bounded X has a similar
proof.
2. This is immediate from the definition of pure threshold rules.
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3. This follows from Lemma 7, Chapter 4. The intuition is that for any ν ∈ QX(T )
we can find a stopping time τ ∈ TR such that L(Xτ ) = ν. This type of task is known
as Skorokhod embedding problem(See Skorokhod (1965)).
Note that the certainty equivalent depends only on the law of Xτ . The follow-
ing result is classical. (In discrete time see Karni and Safra (1990), in mathe-
matical finance see Dayanik and Karatzas (2003) and recently in discrete time in
Strack and Viefers (2017). For a textbook treatment, see Chapter 4, Peskir and
Shiryaev (2006).)
Proposition 1. 1. CEU (TT ) = CEU (TR) = CEU (T ).
2. CEU (T ) = U−1(gcv(s(y))) where gcv is the smallest concave majorant of g =
U ◦ s−1.
Corollary 1. In trying to find the optimal stopping rule in the classical (single
utility) case it is sufficient to restrict attention to pure threshold strategies of the
form τ = τYa,b.
Proof of Proposition 1. This proposition is standard but we provide a short proof
which will have parallels to our method in the CSC case. The results will follow if
we can show that supτ∈TT E
x[g(Xτ )] = supτ∈T Ex[g(Xτ )] = gcv(x). Note that g =
U ◦s−1 is increasing. For d ≥ 0 suppose g(z) ≤ c+dz. Then, by the supermartingale
property of X, Ex[g(Xτ )] ≤ c+ dEx[Xτ ] ≤ c+ dx. Taking an infimum over c, d ≥ 0
for which c + dz ≥ g(z) we find supτ∈T Ex[g(Xτ )] = gcv(x). Conversely, either
g(x) = gcv(x) and then supτ∈TT E
x[g(Xτ )] ≥ Ex[g(X0)] = gcv(x) or there exists a
largest interval Ix with endpoints {ax, bx} such that x ∈ Ix and g(z) < gcv(z) on
Ix. If g(ax) = g
cv(ax) and g(bx) = g
cv(bx) then supτ∈TT E
x[g(Xτ )] ≥ Ex[g(XτXa,b)] =
gcv(x). Otherwise, there exist an → ax and bn → bx such that g(an)→ gcv(ax) and
g(bn)→ gcv(bx). Then supτ∈TT E
x[g(Xτ )] ≥ lim supEx[g(XτXan,bn )] = g
cv(x).
3.4.2 Optimal stopping under Cautious Stochastic Choice
Our goal in this section is to develop an optimal stopping model with CSC. Let Y
be a time-homogeneous diffusion with state space IY . Let WY ⊆ F ĪY↑ be a set of
increasing utility functions. The goal is to find supτ∈S infu∈WY u
−1(E[u(Yτ )]), where
τ is chosen from a suitable set of stopping times S. We define ∆Y = P(ĪY ). Recall
that QY (S) = {ν : ν = L(Yτ ); τ ∈ S}. By Lemma 1 we have QY (TT ) ⊂ QY (TR) =
QY (T ) ⊆ ∆Y .
As in the classical, single-utility setting, it is often convenient to work with the
process X in natural scale rather than Y . We set WX = {g = u ◦ s−1;u ∈ WY }.
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Define ∆X = P(ĪX). Again by Lemma 1 we have QX(TT ) ⊂ QX(TR) = QX(T ) ⊆
∆X .
For a fixed stopping time τ and a fixed utility u ∈ W we define the certainty
equivalent
Cuτ = u
−1(E[u(Yτ )]) = u−1(E[g(Xτ )]) = s−1(g−1(E[g(Xτ )])). (3.6)
Once we have minimized over utilities the value function for a single stopping time
is Vτ = inf
u∈WY
Cuτ . Under CSC the optimal stopping problem is to find V (S) =
supτ∈S Vτ where S is a set of stopping times. Since Vτ depends on the stopping
time only through the law of the stopped process we have



















and τ∗ ∈ argmaxτ∈S Vτ . In particular, we want to consider S = T , S = TR and
S = TT .
The following result is key to solving (3.7):
Proposition 2. For V defined in (3.7), we have V (TT ) ≤ V (TR) = V (T ).
The proposition follows that Lemma 1. Lemma 1 characterizes the sets QX(S)
for various sets S. However, the sets T , TT and TR do not depend on whether we
consider stopping times for the process X or Y . Hence {ν : ν ∈ QY (S)} = {η]s :
η ∈ QX(S)} where, by definition η]s(A) = η(s(A)). From our perspective, the
content of Proposition 2 is that V (TR) = V (T ). The first main result of this paper,
is to show that, unlike in the classical case (see Proposition 1, (1), we may have
V (TT ) < V (TR)).
3.5 A stylized example
Our goal in this section is to give an example for which we can prove that the optimal
stopping rule is not a pure threshold strategy. Instead there is an optimal stopping
rule which is a non-trivial mixture of threshold stopping rules. The example is highly
stylized, and deliberately simple, and this allows us to give a full and complete
solution, i.e. we are able to solve for the optimal mixed threshold rule. Crucially,














Figure 3.2: The family of utility functions W = {um;m ∈ M}, where um is defined for
m ∈M by um(w) = kw, 0 ≤ w < m and um(w) = αm,w ≥ m for constants α > k > 0. Let
M = [m∗,m∗] with m∗ > αyk and m
∗ = αm∗k .
We work with a process Y which is already in natural scale, and a family of payoff
functions {um}m∈M whereM⊂ R. The process Y is assumed to be bounded below
(without loss of generality by zero) and unbounded above, to be a local martingale
and to have initial value y > 0. Then Y is a supermartingale. The canonical example
is if Y is a Brownian motion started at y and absorbed at zero. Alternatively, we
may consider Y to be geometric Brownian motion with zero drift. The goal in this
section is to give an example for which
V (TT ) < V (TR) = V (T ).
Hence, there is no pure threshold strategy which is optimal within class of all stop-
ping rules.
Fix constants α > k > 0, together with m∗ >
αy
k . Set m
∗ = αm∗k and let M be
the interval M = [m∗,m∗]. For m ∈M define um : I ≡ [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) by
um(w) =
kw, 0 ≤ w < m;αm, w ≥ m; (3.8)
and set W = {um;m ∈ M}. Figure 3.2 illustrates the family of utilities described
here.
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Note that the results generalize to utility functions which replace um(w) = αm
with um(w) = J(m) for w ≥ m in (3.8), where J is a strictly increasing function
with J(m) > km. We will consider this more general case in Section 3.5.4.
3.5.1 Pure threshold strategies
Our first result is that in the stylized example there is no pure threshold strategy
which outperforms the trivial strategy of stopping immediately. Note that since Y
is a supermartingale and since um(z) ≤ αz, we have for all τ ∈ T
E[um(Yτ )] ≤ αE[Yτ ] ≤ αy < km∗.
Since u−1m (w) =
w
k for w < km∗ we have for any τ ∈ T




Recall τβ,γ = inf{s : Ys /∈ (β, γ)}. For m ∈ M and 0 ≤ β ≤ y ≤ γ let Gmβ,γ be
the expected utility associated with the stopping time τβ,γ and the utility function
um and let C
m








ky γ ∈ [y,m)(αm y−βγ−β + kβ γ−yγ−β) γ ≥ m (3.10)
Cmβ,γ =
y γ ∈ [y,m)1
k
(






Note that for each m ∈ M, Gmβ,γ and Cmβ,γ are non-increasing in γ for γ ≥ m∗.
Also, for each m ∈ M, and γ ≤ m∗, Gmβ,γ and Cmβ,γ are non-increasing in β for
0 ≤ β ≤ y.




Proof. If γ ∈ [y,m∗) then Cmβ,γ = y for all m ∈M.





























Finally, if γ ∈ [m∗,m∗) then infm∈MCmβ,γ ≤ Cm
∗
β,γ = y.
The first statement of the lemma follows from consideration of the three possible
cases. The second statement follows from the first, given that for all m, Cmβ,y = y.
Theorem 3. In our stylized example no pure threshold strategies outperforms stop-
ping immediately.
Proof of Theorem 3. The result follows immediately from the previous lemma that
in our stylized example V (TT ) = y. From the perspective of the worst agent, any
pure threshold strategy can only generate at best a certainty equivalent which is the
same as the certainty equivalent from selling the asset immediately.
3.5.2 Improvement with randomisation between Two Upper Thresh-
olds
The goal of this section is to show that there are mixtures of threshold strategies
which outperform the best pure threshold strategies. In addition we will develop
some intuition which we can use to motivate the derivation of the optimal ran-
domised strategy.
The remarks after (3.11) suggest that it is not sensible to use upper thresholds
above m∗, and that it is sufficient to only consider lower thresholds which are set to
zero. (This result is proved in Lemma 4 ) In this section we consider using stopping
rules which are a mixture of τ0,γ and τ0,ε for m∗ ≤ γ < ε ≤ m∗. If τ is this mixed
stopping rule and ε < m∗ then um∗(Yτ ) = kYτ and the certainty equivalent is equal
to y. So, if we hope to outperform pure threshold rules we must take ε = m∗.
Let T 02 be the set of stopping rules obtained from mixing two pure threshold
strategies, both with lower threshold 0, and one with upper threshold at m∗, and the
other with upper threshold in [m∗,m
∗). Then T 02 = {τ θγ : θ ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [m∗,m∗)}
where τ θγ = τ0,γ with probability θ and τ
θ
γ = τ0,m∗ otherwise. The randomisation






the linearity of u−1m over the relevant domain (recall (3.9))
Cm,θγ = u−1m
(














θ + (1− θ) αmkm∗
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m∗ ≤ m ≤ γ ≤ m∗.
Fix γ ∈ [m∗,m∗) and θ. As a function of m, Hθγ(m) = C
m,θ
γ is increasing in m
on both [m∗, γ] and (γ,m













Continuing to fix γ but allowing the mixture parameter θ to vary, the first term in
the minimum in (3.12) is increasing in θ whereas the second is decreasing in θ. Also,
at θ = 0, Cm∗,0γ = y < αγkm∗ y = C
γ+,0
γ and at θ = 1, Cm∗,1γ = m
∗
γ y > y = C
γ+,1
γ . It
follows that infm Cm,θγ is maximized over θ at the value of θ for which Cm∗,θγ = Cγ+,θγ ,














γ + γ − 2m∗
.
Finally, we find the maximizer over γ is γ = γ∗ where γ∗ =
√
m∗m∗, and then
















Hence, V (T 02 ) > V (TT ) and a fortiori V (T ) > V (TT ).
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Theorem 4. In our stylized example the best strategy outperforms the best pure
threshold strategy.
In addition to the above result, we can learn something from our analysis about
the optimal mixture of thresholds. First we expect that there must be a positive
probability that we take an upper threshold of m∗, else the certainty equivalent
associated with um∗ is y. Second, by considering the problem for finite mixtures of
upper thresholds, we expect that the certainty equivalent associated with um should
be constant over m.
3.5.3 The Optimal Solution
Next we record some useful properties about Gmβ,γ Cmβ,γ which follow immediately
from the definitions in (3.11).
Lemma 3. 1. For each m ∈ M, Gmβ,γ and Cmβ,γ are non-increasing in γ for γ ≥
m∗. Hence, for γ ≥ m∗, infmCmβ,γ ≤ infmCmβ,m∗.
2. For each m ∈ M, and γ ≤ m∗, Gmβ,γ and Cmβ,m are non-increasing in β for
0 ≤ β ≤ y. Hence for γ ≤ m∗, infmCmβ,γ ≤ infmCm0,γ.
Consider the spaces of probability measures P(M), P({0} ×M) and P([0, y) ×
[y,∞]). For any A × B ∈ P({0} × M), we have A is a point mass at 0 of size
1. Thus, there is an obvious 1-1 correspondence between measures ζ̃ ∈ P(M) and
ζ̂ ∈ P({0}×M) given by ζ̂({0}×B) = ζ̃(B). Write η̃ = p(η̂) for this correspondence.








γ≤m∗ η(dβ, dγ) , γ ≤ m∗
η̂({0}, dγ) =
∫






γ≥m∗ η(dβ, dγ) , γ ≥ m
∗
Recall Gmβ,γ = E[um(Yτβ,γ )] and Cmβ,γ = u−1m (Gmβ,γ). Let η be a probability measure
on [0, y)× [y,∞]. We can define a randomised stopping time τ = τη by generating a
random variable Θ = (Θβ,Θγ) with law η on [0, y)× [y,∞] and setting τ = τΘβ ,Θγ .





η(dβ, dγ)Gmβ,γ = Eη[um(Yτβ,γ )]
Finally we set Cmη to be the certainty equivalent: Cmη = u−1m (Gmη ).
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Lemma 4. Gmη ≤ GmP (η).
Proof. From Lemma 3, for m ∈M and γ ≥ m∗, Gmβ,γ ≤ Gmβ,m∗ ≤ Gm0,m∗ . Similarly, for
m ∈M and γ < m∗, Gmβ,γ = y = Gmβ,m∗ = G
m
0,m∗ Then defining M(γ) = (γ∨m∗)∧m
∗
we have Gmβ,γ ≤ Gm0,M(γ). It follows that for all (β, γ) ∈ ([0, y) × [y,∞]) we have





η̂(dβ, dγ)Gmβ,γ = Gmη̂ .














































Since P({0} ×M) ⊆ P([0, y)× [y,∞]) the inequality (3.13) is an equality, and the
result follows.
Let T 0R be the subset of TR such that the lower threshold in the randomisation
mixture is always at zero, and the upper threshold is in M. Then
T 0R = {τη : η ∈ P({0} ×M)}. (3.14)
Proposition 3. V (T 0R) = V (TR) = V (T ).
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ζ be a probability measure on {0}×M ⊆ [0, y)× [y,∞).









= u−1m (Gmζ̃ ).
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Corollary 2 shows that V (T 0R) = V (TR) and it is sufficient to only consider thresh-
old strategies in the mixture with lower bound at 0 and upper bound in M. The
fact that V (TR) = V (T ) follows from Proposition 2 and Q(TR) = Q(T ).
Thus, in the stylized example and when considering optimal mixtures of threshold
strategies it is sufficient to restrict attention to mixtures in which the lower threshold
is always zero and the upper threshold is contained in M. Our calculation of the
optimal strategy in the CSC setting is based on the following general proposition.
Let Z be a set and let N be a measurable space. Let D : Z ×N 7→ R be a map and
set D∗(z) = infn∈N D(z, n) and D
∗ = D∗(Z) = supz∈Z D∗(z).
Proposition 4. Suppose there exist Z0 ⊆ Z, N0 ⊆ N , z∗ ∈ Z0, ν ∈ P(N0), a
family (hn)n∈N0 of strictly increasing functions hn : R 7→ R and constants D̂, Ĥ
such that
D(z∗, n) ≥ D̂ on N with D(z∗, n) = D̂ on N0∫
N0 ν(dn)hn(D(z, n)) ≤ Ĥ on Z with
∫
N0 ν(dn)hn(D(z, n)) = Ĥ on Z0
Then, for any z ∈ Z
D∗(z) ≤ D∗(z∗) = D∗
In our interpretation we take Z to be either the space of stopping rules or the
space of attainable laws or the set of randomisations of the levels of lower and upper
thresholds. (Since our problem is law invariant, the final result will be equivalent.)
Z0 is a space of relevant stopping rules or attainable laws or randomisations, for
example the set of randomised threshold rules for which the upper barrier lies in
some interval. N is a parameterization of the space of utility functions and N0
is a set of relevant utility functions. We may have N0 6= N if there are utility
functions for which the certainty equivalent is never the lowest over the family of
utility functions. See Section 3.5.4 for an example. Then D(z, n) is the certainty
equivalent using utility function un and stopping rule z; D∗(z) is the CSC value of
the stopping rule z.
The first idea behind the proof is that we expect the certainty equivalent value of
the optimal stopping rule to be constant across the set of (relevant) utility functions.
If not, we might expect to be able to improve the certainty equivalent value under
the worst utility, at the expense of the certainty equivalent values of those utilities
which have a higher certainty equivalent value. This would raise the CSC value.
Hence we expect D(z∗, n) is constant on N0 for the optimal choice z∗.
The second idea is that we want there to be only one (randomised threshold)
stopping rule for which the certainty equivalent is constant (accross all relevant
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utilities). This possibility is achieved by a requirement that no stopping rule can
achieve a certainty equivalent value which exceeds that of another relevant stopping
rule, uniformly across all relevant utilities.
Proof. Take z ∈ Z and w in Z0. Suppose D(z, n) > D(w, n) for all n ∈ N0.
Then hn(D(z, n)) > hn(D(w, n)) for all n ∈ N0 and Ĥ ≥
∫
N0 ν(dn)hn(D(z, n)) >∫
N0 ν(dn)hn(D(w, n)) = Ĥ contradicting the hypothesis of the theorem. Hence, for
any z ∈ Z, w ∈ Z0 there exists a non-empty set Nz,w ⊆ N0 such that D(z, n) ≤
D(w, n) on Nz,w. Taking w = z∗ , we have




D(z, n) ≤ inf
n∈Nz,z∗
D(z, n) ≤ inf
n∈Nz,z∗
D(z∗, n)
By assumption, we have
inf
n∈Nz,z∗
D(z∗, n) = D̂ = inf
n∈N
D(z, n) = D∗(z
∗) = D∗.
Theorem 5. Suppose η̃ ∈ P(M) is a mixture of a point mass at m∗ of size θ∗ and
an absolutely continuous measure ρ on (m∗,m

















Then an optimal strategy is to take a randomised strategy with mixture distribution









Proof of Theorem 5. The idea is to apply Proposition 4. To this end take Z0 = Z =
P(M), N0 = N =M and set
f(γ,m) = E[gm(Yτ0,γ )] = Gm0,γ =
{
ky γ ∈ [m∗,m)
αmy
γ γ ∈ [m,m
∗].
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Then by Proposition 4, if we can find ζ̃ ∈ P(M) such that Cm
ζ̃
does not depend on
m and ν such that
∫
M f(γ,m)ν(dm) does not depend on γ then ζ̃ characterizes the
optimal mixture of thresholds.
The required conditions follow from the next two lemmas.
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Lemma 6. Let λ = αk > 1. Let ν be a mixture of an atom of size φ = (λ
λ
λ−1−λ+1)−1








M f(γ,m)ν(dm) does not depend on γ.
Proof. Set β = 2−λλ−1 . Then β + 1 =
1
λ−1 and β + 2 =
λ
λ−1 With the absolutely





























































The two square brackets in this last expression are zero by the choice of D and β.
Hence
∫
f(γ,m)ν(dm) does not depend on γ.
It is worth highlighting here that the optimal stopping rule is not unique and
although in Theorem 5 we find the optimal mixed threshold rule, there are other
stopping times which are also optimal. In other words, suppose τ ∈ TR is a ran-
domised threshold rule (which is not a pure threshold rule): then there exist other
stopping times τ ′ ∈ T for which L(Xτ ) = L(Xτ ′) or equivalently L(Yτ ) = L(Yτ ′).
3.5.4 A Generalized Example
Fix L > 0 and suppose R ∈ (L,∞). Let J : [L,R] 7→ R be a continuously dif-
ferentiable function with J(z) > z and such that supz∈[L,R]
J(z)
z < κ < ∞, where
κ > 1 is constant. Let K : [L,R] 7→ R be the largest increasing differentiable func-
tion such that K ≤ J and
∫ R
L dβ
∣∣∣ K′(β)K(β)−β ∣∣∣ < ∞. Suppose J(L) = K(L) ≥ R and
that the set {x : K(x) = J(x)} is the union of a finite set of intervals. We write
{x : K(x) = J(x)} = ∪Ni=1[`i, ri]. Then `1 = L and rN = R.
Let A = [L,R] and for α ∈ A define uα : [0,∞) 7→ R by
uα(z) =
{
z 0 ≤ z < α;
J(α) z ≥ α.
(3.15)
Let W = {uα : α ∈ [L,R]}.
Let Y be Brownian motion started at y ∈ (0, Lκ ), and absorbed at 0. Consider






Note that for any α ∈ [L,R] , we have uα(z) ≤ κz. It follows that for any stopping
time τ , E[uα(Yτ )] ≤ κE[Yτ ] ≤ κy < L. But u−1(x) = x over this range. Hence
the u−1 may be omitted in the definition of the Cautious Stochastic Utility in this
example.


































Let η̃ ∈ P([L,R]) be the probability measure with density ρ on [L,R] and a point
mass of size θ at R.
Then an optimal strategy is to take a randomized threshold strategy with mixture
distribution η̂ where η̂({0}, dγ) = η̃(dγ) and η̂ does not charge (0, x)× [x,∞].
Proof of Theorem 6. We apply Proposition 4. Let Z be the set of probability mea-
sures on [0, y)× [y,∞] for some y ∈ (0, Lκ ) and let Z0 ⊆ Z be the set of probability
measures with support {0} × [L,R]. Let N = [L,R] and let N0 = {α : K(α) =
J(α)} ⊆ N .
Then Z is the set of candidate randomizations , and Z0 is a set of relevant
randomizations which are not dominated by some other randomization. N is a
parameterization of the utility functions, and N0 is a set of utility functions such
that no member dominates any other element of N .
Recall the definitions of θ, ρ, η̃ and η̂ from the theorem. By the choice of θ, η̃ is












































uα(β)(γ − y) + uα(γ)(y − β)
y(γ − β)
.






where ζ̃ = p(ζ̂).
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Then, for η̂ ∈ Z as in the statement of the Theorem,
1
y










ρ(β) + ∆(β)K ′(β) +K(β)∆′(β)
]
dβ
= θ + J(L)∆(L)
where we use the first inequality in (3.17) to show that the integrand in the penul-
timate line is zero.
Then, if D̂ = θ + J(L)∆(L) we have for all α ∈ N ,
E[uα(Yτη̂)] ≥ D̂
with equality if α ∈ N0.
It remains to show that there exists a measure ν with support in [L,R] and Ĥ
such that
∫
N0 ν(dα)D(ζ, α) = Ĥ for ζ ∈ Z0, and
∫
N0 ν(dα)D(ζ, α) ≤ Ĥ for general
ζ ∈ Z. (We take hα(d) = d for all α ∈ N .)
Recall that {z : K(z) = J(z)} = ∪Ni=1[`i, ri]. Let ν be the measure on {z : K(z) =
J(z)} such that ν has atoms of size φi at `i for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , together with a
density ζ on ∪Ni=1(`i, ri) given by








Here φ1 = 1 and ζ1 =
φ1J(L)












































α>w ν(dα) is constant for w ∈ N0.
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We get that Γ is constant on (`i, ri) provided Υ(w) = 0 where Υ(w) =
∫
α≤wK(α)ν(dα)−
ζ(w)w(K(w) − w). But Υ′(w) = ζ(w)[w(2 −K ′(w))] − ζ ′(w)w(K(w) − w) = 0 by
the definition of ζ. Moreover, by the definition of ζi in (3.19) Υ(`i) = 0. Hence
Υ ≡ 0 on [`i, ri] and Γ(w) is constant on this interval.































by the definition of φi+1 in (3.18).
Finally, we consider general η ∈ P([0, y) × [y,∞]). Recall the definition of ζ̂ =
P (η). From Lemma 4, Gmη ≤ GmP (η) for all m ∈ [L,M ]. Then D(η,m) ≤ D(P (η),m)





ν(dm)D(P (η),m) = Ĥ.
Note that if J is not strictly increasing then we have that K is constant over
intervals and µ̃ does not charge such intervals. The reason for this is that the
corresponding uα strictly dominate other uβ and are never the worst case utilities.
For this reason they are not relevant in the CSC formulation. In the proof in the
appendix, the utility functions are divided into two classes. For elements of the first
class, the certainty equivalent is never smallest, and these utilities do not affect the
CSC value. However, all elements of the second class are important, and we find
the optimal strategy by making sure that the certainty equivalent is constant across
utilities in this class, at least for the optimal mixed threshold stopping rule.
3.6 Two realistic models
In the previous section we studied a stylized liquidation problem and showed that in
the CSC paradigm it is possible that the optimal strategy is not of threshold form.
In this section we give two examples of more realistic models which are based on
either S-shaped reference dependent utilities or on concave utilities.
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3.6.1 An example with S-shaped reference dependent utilities
The first model is based on combining CSC with S-shaped reference-dependent
preferences (Tversky and Kahneman (1992), see Kyle et al (2006), Henderson (2012),
Ingersoll and Jin (2013), and Magnani (2016) in context of optimal stopping). This
example can be shown to reduce to a form which is very closely related to the stylized
example.
Suppose Y follows geometric Brownian motion and solves dYt = σYtdBt + µYtdt
subject to Y0 = y. We assume 0 < µ <
1
2σ
2. Let WY = {ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} be a
family of S-shaped reference dependent utility functions with
ui(z) =
{
(z −Ri)δi z ≥ Ri
−κi(Ri − z)δi z < Ri
(3.20)
where {(δi, Ri, κi)}1≤i≤N is a family of parameters. Here, for each i, δi ∈ (0, 1) is a
risk aversion/risk seeking parameter, Ri > 0 is the reference level and κi ≥ 1 is the





u−1i (E[ui(Yτ )]). (3.21)
Define ψ = 1 − 2µ
σ2
∈ (0, 1) and set s(z) = zψ. Set X = s(Y ) and x = s(y).
Then X solves dXt = ψσXtdBt subject to X0 = x := y
ψ > 0. We have X is a
non-negative martingale for t ∈ [0,∞). Set gi = ui ◦ s−1 so that
gi(w) =
{
(w1/ψ −Ri)δi w ≥ Rψi
−κi(Ri − w1/ψ)δi w < Rψi
(3.22)
and set WX = {gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. By an immediate extension of the arguments














and hence in the search for the optimal stopping rule it is sufficient to consider the
problem in natural scale for X and WX .
Families of functions WY and WX are given in Figure 3.3 for the parameters:
ψ = 0.5, N = 3 and {(δi, Ri, κi)} = {(0.15, 1, 2), (0.1, 2, 2), (0.08, 3, 2)}. (3.23)
Note that certainty equivalents are invariant under affine transformations of the
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(a) ui ∈ WY











(b) gi ∈ WX
Figure 3.3: The families of S-shaped reference dependent utility functions WY = {ui :
1 ≤ i ≤ N} with ui defined in (3.20) and in natural scale WX = {gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
with gi given in (3.22). Parameters used are ψ = 1/2 for the price process, N = 3 and
{(δi, Ri, κi)} = {(0.15, 1, 2), (0.1, 2, 2), (0.08, 3, 2)} for the utility functions where for each i,
δi ∈ (0, 1) is a risk aversion/risk seeking parameter, Ri > 0 is the reference level and κi ≥ 1
is the loss aversion parameter.











Figure 3.4: The family of transformed utility functions W̃X = {g̃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} where g̃i is
given by (3.24) with x̂ = 0.8. Parameters used are ψ = 1/2 for the price process, N = 3 and
{(δi, Ri, κi)} = {(0.15, 1, 2), (0.1, 2, 2), (0.08, 3, 2)} for the utility functions where for each i,
δi ∈ (0, 1) is a risk aversion/risk seeking parameter, Ri > 0 is the reference level and κi ≥ 1
is the loss aversion parameter.
objective function: if ha,b(w) = ah(w) + b with a > 0 then h
−1
a,b(E[ha,b(Z)]) =
h−1(E[h(Z)]). Hence, without loss of generality we may replace WX = {gi : 1 ≤ i ≤






Figure 3.5: The certainty equivalent value under a pure threshold strategy τX0,γ = inf{t :
Xt /∈ (0, γ)} as a function of upper threshold γ for γ > X0 = x = 0.2. The family of
S-shaped utility functions ui as defined in (3.20) are used. The best pure threshold strategy
uses an upper threshold of about 2.75 and gives a CSC certainty equivalent of 0.7263, as
marked on the figure. Parameters used are ψ = 1/2 for the price process, N = 3 and
{(δi, Ri, κi)} = {(0.15, 1, 2), (0.1, 2, 2), (0.08, 3, 2)} for the utility functions where for each i,
δi ∈ (0, 1) is a risk aversion/risk seeking parameter, Ri > 0 is the reference level and κi ≥ 1
is the loss aversion parameter.
These linear transformations have been designed so that g̃i(0) = 0 and g̃i(x̂) = 1
for all i. Then, the functions g̃i are of comparable sizes over the region [0, x̂] and
we expect that over the relevant range g−1i does not depend greatly on i. The
transformed family of functions W̃X are plotted in Figure 3.4. The key observation
is that the resulting objective functions are similar to those studied in the stylized
example in Section 3.5. Hence we expect a similar conclusion: it is not optimal to
use a pure threshold rule, and instead there is an optimal stopping rule which is a
non-trivial mixture of threshold rules.
Consider first the certainty equivalent from using a pure threshold strategy τX0,γ =
inf{t : Xt /∈ (0, γ)} for γ > x = 0.2. The certainty equivalents associated with the
utilities (ui)i=1,2,3 as a function of the upper threshold are plotted in Figure 3.5. We
see from the figure that the best pure threshold strategy uses an upper threshold of
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Figure 3.6: CSC value using the optimal mixture for a given pair of upper threshold levels
where X0 = x = 0.2. The family of S-shaped utility functions ui as defined in (3.20) are
used. The best pair of upper thresholds is 1.1, 3.1 giving a CSC certainty equivalent of
0.8368. Parameters used are ψ = 1/2 for the price process, N = 3 and {(δi, Ri, κi)} =
{(0.15, 1, 2), (0.1, 2, 2), (0.08, 3, 2)} for the utility functions where for each i, δi ∈ (0, 1) is a
risk aversion/risk seeking parameter, Ri > 0 is the reference level and κi ≥ 1 is the loss
aversion parameter.
approximately 2.75 and yields a CSC certainty equivalent of 0.7263.
Now suppose we are allowed to search for the best mixed threshold strategy based
on two upper thresholds (with the lower threshold set to zero). Figure 3.6 shows
the highest CSC value (as the mixture parameter varies) for a given pair of upper
thresholds. Figure 3.7 shows how much probability mass is assigned to the smaller
of the two upper thresholds.
The best strategy to to assign probability mass 0.75,0.25 to thresholds 1.1,3.1
respectively, giving a CSC value of 0.8368. From Figure 3.7 we see that for other
pairs of thresholds, it is optimal to place all the weight on a single threshold, but for
the optimal pair of thresholds the optimal strategy is a proper mixture. It follows
that the best randomised strategy is strictly better than any pure threshold strategy.
We can also consider a mixture which involves at most three upper thresholds. We
find that in this restricted class, the optimal randomised strategy assigns probability
mass 0.76, 0.11, 0.13 to thresholds 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 respectively and gives a CSC value
of 0.8425. Again, we see an improvement as we allow for mixtures over a larger
number of thresholds. However, the benefit from adding more upper thresholds is
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Figure 3.7: Optimal mixture distribution: the weight placed on the smaller of the upper
thresholds for a given pair of upper thresholds. When both upper thresholds are large, it is
optimal to not use a mixture, and only stop at the smaller of the upper thresholds; when
both upper thresholds are small, it is again optimal not to use a mixture, and only stop at
the larger of the upper thresholds. When the smaller upper threshold is in the range 1− 3,
it is optimal to use a mixed strategy, with most of the mixture distribution on the smaller of
the two upper thresholds. Again, X0 = x = 0.2. The optimal mixture is to place probability
mass 0.75 on threshold 1.1 and weight 0.25 on threshold 3.1. The family of S-shaped utility
functions ui as defined in (3.20) are used. Parameters used are ψ = 1/2 for the price process,
N = 3 and {(δi, Ri, κi)} = {(0.15, 1, 2), (0.1, 2, 2), (0.08, 3, 2)} for the utility functions where
for each i, δi ∈ (0, 1) is a risk aversion/risk seeking parameter, Ri > 0 is the reference level
and κi ≥ 1 is the loss aversion parameter.
diminishing, and the improvement in the CSC value from allowing mixed strategies
which randomise over 4 upper thresholds is negligible.
The results of randomisation among upper thresholds for the family of S-shaped
utility functions (in Figure 3.3) are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.6.2 An example based on concave utilities
In the previous example we used a family of S-shaped reference dependent utility
functions. We saw that the problem could be reduced to a problem which shared
many features with the stylized problem of Section 3.5. In this section we build
a model using concave utility functions. We build our example from the sum of a
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Number of Thresholds Best Thresholds Best Mass Distribution Best CSC
1 2.75 1 0.7263
2 (1.1, 3.1) (0.75, 0.25) 0.8368
3 (1.1, 2.1, 3.1) (0.76, 0.11, 0.13) 0.8425
4 Negligible improvement over 3 thresholds case
Table 3.1: Summary of results of randomisation among upper thresholds for the family of
S-shaped utility functions in Figure 3.3.
Number of Thresholds Best Thresholds Best Mass Distribution Best CSC
1 22..68 1 0.6215
2 (3.84, 187.42) (0.56, 0.44) 0.6373
3 Negligible improvement over 2 thresholds case
Table 3.2: Summary of results of randomisation among upper thresholds for the family of
concave utility functions in Figure 3.8.
power utility function and an exponential utility.2
As in Section 3.6.1, suppose Y is geometric Brownian motion with scale function
s(z) = zψ for ψ ∈ (0, 1). For γ, κ, φ non-negative constants, define f = fγ,κ,φ :
R+ 7→ R+ by







Then f(0) = 0 and provided φ < 1, f is concave. Set g(w) = f ◦ s−1 so that
gγ,κ,φ(w) = fγ,κ,φ(w
1/ψ). Then







Provided ψ < φ we have that g is convex for small values of w and concave for larger
values. We will thus assume ψ < φ < 1.
Let WY = {ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} where ui(z) = fγi,κi,φi(z). Then WX = {gi : 1 ≤
i ≤ N} where gi(w) = gγi,κi,φi(w). Families of functions WY and WX are given in
Figure 3.8 for the parameters:
ψ = 1/4, N = 3 and {(γi, κi, φi)} = {(0.9, 1, 0.9), (0.5, 10, 0.4), (0.2, 20, 0.3)}.
(3.27)
2Our experience is that it is quite difficult to build examples based on families of concave utilities
for which randomisation is beneficial, especially if we restrict attention to standard one-parameter
families (eg. CRRA or CARA). However, this example shows that it is possible to build examples
of families of concave utilities for which randomisation over thresholds is beneficial.
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(a) ui ∈ WY










(b) gi ∈ WX
Figure 3.8: The families of concave utility functions WY = {ui : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} with
ui(z) = fγi,κi,φi(z) and f defined in (3.25). In natural scale, WX = {gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} with
gi(w) = gγi,κi,φi(w) where g is given in (3.26). Parameters used are ψ = 1/4 for the price
process, N = 3 and {(γi, κi, φi)} = {(0.9, 1, 0.9), (0.5, 10, 0.4), (0.2, 20, 0.3)}.
























Figure 3.9: The certainty equivalent value under a pure threshold strategy τX0,γ = inf{t :
Xt /∈ (0, γ)} as a function of upper threshold γ for γ > X0 = x = 0.5. The family of
concave utility functions ui(z) = fγi,κi,φi(z) with f defined in (3.25) are used. The best
pure threshold strategy uses an upper threshold of approximately 22.68 and gives a CSC
certainty equivalent of 0.6215, as marked on the figure. Parameters used are ψ = 1/4 for
the price process, N = 3 and {(γi, κi, φi)} = {(0.9, 1, 0.9), (0.5, 10, 0.4), (0.2, 20, 0.3)}.
Consider first pure threshold strategies, τX0,γ for different upper thresholds γ. The
certainty equivalents associated with the utilities {ui}i=1,2,3 as a function of the
upper threshold are plotted in Figure 3.9 with an initial value of X0 = x = 0.5. We
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see from the figure that the best pure threshold strategy uses an upper threshold of
approximately 22.68 and yields a CSC certainty equivalent of 0.6215.
If we now search for the best randomisation over two upper thresholds we find
that the best strategy is to assign probability mass 0.56, 0.44 to thresholds 3.84,
187.42 respectively and that this gives a CSC value of 0.6373. Again the best
randomised strategy is strictly better than any pure threshold strategy. However,
allowing randomisation over three upper thresholds brings only negligible further
benefits. The results of randomisation among upper thresholds for the family of
concave utilities (in Figure 3.8) are summarized in Table 3.2.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper considers agents who exhibit cautious stochastic choice (CSC) and who
face optimal timing or stopping decisions in a dynamic setting. We build on the
seminal work on CSC in a static setting by Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2015, 2017) and
provide a continuous-time optimal stopping model under CSC. In our dynamic setup,
the value associated with a stopping rule is not quasi-convex and hence we cannot
necessarily expect there to be a pure threshold rule which is optimal. Despite
this observation, it is quite a challenge to find examples where it can be clearly
demonstrated that the optimal stopping rule is a non-trivial mixture of threshold
strategies. This paper has taken up this challenge and provides first, a stylized,
tractable example whereby the optimal stopping rule and value can be constructed
explicitly, and second, two realistic example models under reference-dependent or
concave families of utility functions under which pure threshold strategies are not
optimal. Our predictions are in line with recent experimental evidence in dynamic
settings whereby individuals do not play cut-off or threshold strategies (Strack and
Viefers (2017), Fischbacher, Hoffmann and Schudy (2015)).
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Chapter 4
Optimal Stopping and the
Sufficiency of Randomised
Threshold Strategies
4.1 Introduction and main results
Let Y = (Yt)t≥0 be a one-dimensional, time-homogeneous, continuous strong-Markov
process. Let T be the set of all stopping times, let TT be the set of all threshold
stopping times, and let TR be the set of randomised threshold stopping times (see
definition in Chapter 3.4.1). Note that TT ⊂ TR ⊂ T . Let V = V (τ) be the value
associated with a stopping rule τ . Consider the optimal stopping problem associated




where S is some set of stopping times (for example S = T or S = TT ), and especially
the problem of finding an optimizer for (4.1). Let Q(S) = {µ : µ = L(Yτ ), τ ∈ S}.
where L(Yτ ) is the law of Yτ .
Assumption 2 (Law invariance). V is law invariant, ie V (τ) = H(L(Yτ )) for some
function H : Q(T ) 7→ R.
We say that V = V (τ) is law invariant if, whenever σ, τ are stopping times,
L(Yσ) = L(Yτ ) implies that V (σ) = V (τ).
Recall that H is quasi-convex if H(λµ1 + (1 − λ)µ2) ≤ max{H(µ1), H(µ2)} for












Recall also that ifH is lower semi-continuous and µn ⇒ µ thenH(µ) ≤ lim inf H(µn).
It follows that H(µ) ≤ lim supH(µn).
The following result is well-known, but we include it as a contrast to our result
on the sufficiency of randomised threshold rules.
Main Result 1 (See Theorem 8 below). Suppose H is quasi-convex and lower
semi-continuous. Then V∗(TT ) = V∗(T ).
Corollary 3. In the setting of Theorem 8, in solving the optimal stopping problem
(4.1) over the set of all stopping times it is sufficient to restrict attention to threshold
rules.
As the canonical example, consider expected utility where the utility is represented
by a continuous, increasing function u. Then, V (τ) = E[u(Yτ )], assuming that the
expectation is well defined. It follows that V is law invariant. Indeed V (τ) =
H(L(Yτ )) where H(ζ) =
∫
u(z)ζ(dz). H is quasi-convex and lower semi-continuous.
In this example it is well known that there is an optimal stopping rule which is
of threshold form, see for example, Dayanik and Karatzas (2003). The fact that
quasi-convexity means that there is no benefit from following randomised strategies
is well understood in the economics literature, see Machina (1985) Camerer and
Ho (1994), Wakker (2010) and He et al (2017).
Recently there has been a surge of interest in problems which, whilst they have the
law invariance property, do not satisfy the quasi-convex criterion. Two examples
are optimal stopping under prospect theory (Xu and Zhou (2013)), and optimal
stopping under cautious stochastic choice (Henderson et al (2017) [23]).
Introduce the set TR of mixed or randomised threshold rules (i.e. stopping rules
which are based on the first exit from a randomly chosen interval).
Main Result 2 (See Theorem 7 below). Suppose law invariance holds for V , but
not quasi-convexity for H. Then V∗(TT ) ≤ V∗(TR) = V∗(T ).
We will show by example that the first inequality may be strict.
Corollary 4. In the setting of Theorem 7, in solving the optimal stopping problem
(4.1) over the set of all stopping rules it is sufficient to restrict attention to ran-
domised threshold rules, but it may not be sufficient to restrict attention to (pure)
threshold rules.
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It should be noted that we do not include discounting in our analysis since a prob-
lem involving discounting does not satisfy the law invariance property. Nonetheless,
as is well known, the conclusion of Corollary 3 remains true for the problem of max-
imizing discounted expected utility of the stopped process V (τ) = E[e−βτu(Yτ )].
However, in problems which go beyond the expected utility paradigm, there are
often modelling issues which mitigate against the inclusion of discounting. For this
reason, historically the literature has concentrated on problems with no discounting.
Finding the optimal stopping rule is often already challenging in these models.
The significance of Corollary 4 is as follows. In many classical models optimal
stopping behaviour involves stopping on first exit from an interval (threshold strate-
gies). However, our result implies that the converse is not true: if decision makers
are observed to stop only when the process is reaching new maxima or minima, then
it does not necessarily mean that they are using threshold strategies. Instead the
decision criteria may be more complicated, and they may be utilising a randomised
threshold rule.
4.2 Problem specification and the problem in natural
scale
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}t≥0,P). Let Y = (Yt)t≥0 be
a (F,P)-stochastic process on this probability space with state space I which is an
interval. Let Ī be the closure of I. We suppose that Y is a regular, one-dimensional,
time-homogeneous diffusion with initial value Y0 = y such that y lies in the interior
of I. For Γ an interval in R or a rectangular set in R2, let B(Γ) denote the Borel
σ-algebra on Γ, and let P(Γ) denote the set of probability measures on (Γ,B(Γ)).
Given that the value associated with a stopping rule is law invariant, one natural
approach to finding the optimal stopping time is to try to characterize Q(S). Often,
the best way to do this is via a change of scale. Let s be a strictly increasing function
such that X = s(Y ) is a local martingale. Let IX = s(I) and let ĪX be the closure
of IX . Then X is a regular, time-homogenous local-martingale diffusion on IX with
initial value x = s(y).
Set QX(S) = {ν : ν = L(Xτ ), τ ∈ S}. Then if L(Xτ ) = ν we have L(Yτ ) = ν]s
where (ν]s)(D) = ν(s(D)). It follows that ν ∈ QX(S) if and only if ν]s ∈ Q(S) and
hence
Q(S) = {ν]s; ν ∈ QX(S)}. (4.3)
Thus, if we can characterize QX(S) then we can also characterize Q(S). Moreover,
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defining HX : QX(T ) 7→ R by HX(ν) = H(ν]s) we have V∗(S) = supµ∈Q(S)H(µ) =
supν∈QX(S)H
X(ν). The problem of optimizing over stopping laws for the problem
with Y becomes a problem of optimizing over the possible laws of the stopped
process X in natural scale.
Note that τa,b = infu≥0{u : Yu /∈ (a, b)} = infu≥0{u : Xu /∈ (s(a), s(b))} =:
τXs(a),s(b). Hence TT has the alternative representation





and the set of threshold stopping times for Y is the set of threshold stopping times
for X. Similarly, TR can be rewritten as TR = T ∩ ({τXη : η ∈ P(DX)}) where
DX = ([−∞, x] ∩ ĪX)× ([x,∞) ∩ ĪX)) and
τXη = inf
u≥0
{u : Xu /∈ (Aη, Bη)where (Aη, Bη) has law η}.
4.3 Characterizing the possible laws of the stopped pro-
cess in natural scale
If X = s(Y ) is in natural scale then the state space of X is an interval IX = s(I)
and X0 = x := s(y). There are four cases:
1. IX is bounded;
2. IX is unbounded above but bounded below;
3. IX is bounded above but unbounded below;
4. IX is unbounded above and below.
The third case can be reduced to the second by reflection. The first case is generally
similar to the second case, and typically the proofs are similar but simpler. The final
case is degenerate and will be treated separately. In the main text we will mainly
present arguments for the second case (with the other cases covered in Chapter 4.6),
but results will be stated in a form which applies in all cases.
Henceforth, in the main text we suppose IX is bounded below, but unbounded
above. Without loss of generality we may assume IX = (0,∞) or [0,∞). Then X is
a non-negative local martingale and hence a super-martingale. Moreover, limt→∞Xt
exists. Hence T includes stopping rules which take infinite values and on {τ =∞}
we assume Xτ = limt→∞Xt = 0. In this case T is the set of all stopping times
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and the intersection with T in the definitions (3.3) and (3.4) is not necessary. By
Fatou’s lemma and the super-martingale property
E[Xτ ] = E[ lim
t→∞
Xt∧τ ] ≤ lim inf
t→∞
E[Xt∧τ ] ≤ x.
In particular, if we set P≤x = {ν ∈ P([0,∞)) :
∫
zν(dz) ≤ x} then QX(T ) ⊆ P≤x.
Lemma 7. QX(T ) = QX(TR).
Proof. Here we prove the lemma in the case where IX is bounded below. We show
that QX(T ) = QX(TR) = P≤x. Given ν ∈ P≤x the aim is to find a stopping
time τ ∈ TR such that L(Xτ ) = ν. The task of finding general stopping times with
L(Xτ ) = ξ for given ξ ∈ P(I
X
) is known as the Skorokhod embedding problem (Sko-
rokhod (1965)). In fact we use an extension of an embedding due to Hall (1998), see
also Durrett (1991). The extension relates to the fact that we allow for target laws
which have a different mean to the initial value of X, whereas the Hall embedding
assumes
∫
zν(dz) = x. The Hall embedding, and the extension we give, are mixtures
of threshold strategies.
Suppose ν is an element of P≤x (and ν is not a point mass at x). The case of ν = δx
corresponds to the (threshold) stopping time τ = 0. Let G be the (right-continuous)




(0,1)G(u)du. In particular, unless
limu↑1G(u) ≤ x there exists a unique solution v∗ ∈ [0, 1) to
∫ 1
v [G(w) − x]dw = 0.
Let z∗ = G(v∗) ≤ x. If limu↑1G(u) ≤ x then set v∗ = 1 and z∗ = limu↑1G(u).
Let ν0 be the measure of size v
∗ such that ν0([0, z)) = v
∗ ∧ ν([0, z)). Then ν0
has support contained in [0, z∗]. Let ν1 be the measure of size 1 − v∗ such that
ν1([0, z)) = (ν([0, z)) − v∗)+. Then ν1 has support in [z∗,∞) and barycentre x.
Moreover ν = ν0 + ν1.
Define c =
∫∞
x (y − x)ν(dy). By construction, c =
∫∞
x (y − x)ν1(dy) and we have
from the fact that ν1 has barycentre x that
∫∞





Let η ∈ P([0, x]× (x,∞]) be given by




































where we use the definition of c and (4.4) in going from the second line to the third.
It remains to show that L(XτXη ) = ν. Let f be a bounded test function. Then,






























































b−a δb. Then χa,b is the law of XτXa,b
. Moreover, L(XτXa,∞) = δa.
Then,
QX(TT ) = (∪0≤a≤xδx) ∪ (∪0≤a<x<b<∞χa,b) .
4.4 Sufficiency of mixed threshold rules
Our main result is that in a large class of problems it is sufficient to search over the
class of mixed threshold rules.
Theorem 7. Suppose Y is a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion. Suppose the law
invariance property holds (Assumption 2) and that the filtration is sufficiently rich.
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Then V∗(T ) = V∗(TR).
Proof. Since QX(T ) = QX(TR) (Lemma 7) we have Q(T ) = Q(TR). Then





Note that it is not our claim that every optimal stopping rule is a mixed threshold
rule. Typically, at least in the case where V (TT ) < V (T ), there will be other optimal
stopping rules which are not of threshold type.
4.4.1 An example - Rank dependent utility
Let Z be a non-negative random variable. Let v : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) be an increas-
ing, differentiable function with v(0) = 0. Then the expected value of v(Z) can be
expressed as E[v(Z)] =
∫∞
0 v
′(z) (1− FZ(z)) dz, where FZ is the cumulative distri-
bution function of Z. Under rank-dependent utility (Quiggin [49]) or probability




v′(z)w (1− FZ(z)) dz
where w : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is an increasing, differentiable probability weighting func-
tion. Writing GZ = F
−1
Z for the quantile function of Z, then after a change of






Now let Y = (Yt)t≥0 be a non-negative diffusion and consider the problem of





Clearly the prospect value depends on the stopping time only through the law of the
stopped process. Hence it is sufficient to characterize the optimal target distribution,
for example via its quantile function. Xu and Zhou [62] solve for the optimal quantile
function in several cases. One relevant case is the following:
Proposition 5 (Xu and Zhou [62]). Suppose Y is in natural scale and has state
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space [0,∞)and initial value y. Suppose v and w are concave. Suppose there exists















Proof of Proposition 5. A proof is given in Xu and Zhou [62, Theorem 5.1], but since
it is short, elegant and pertinent to our main results we include it here. From the
characterization of Q(T ) we have that a quantile function must satisfy
∫ 1
0 G(u)du ≤
y. By construction G∗ has this property, and since v′ and w′ are decreasing, G∗
is increasing. Hence G∗ has the properties required of a quantile function of a
distribution which can be obtained by stopping Y . On the other hand, for any
non-negative function G with
∫ 1























Xu and Zhou (2013) point out that although there is a unique optimal prospect
there are infinitely many stopping rules which attain this prospect. They advocate
the use of the stopping rule based on the Azéma-Yor (1979) stopping time, in which
case the stopping rule has a drawdown feature, and involves stopping the first time
the process falls below some function of the maximum. However, by Theorem 7
there is also a randomised threshold rule which is optimal.
4.5 Sufficient conditions for the optimality of pure thresh-
old rules
In this section we argue that if the value associated with a stopping rule is law
invariant, and if H is quasi-convex and lower semi-continuous then pure threshold
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rules are optimal.
Lemma 8. Suppose ν ∈ QX(T ) consists of finitely many atoms. Then there exists
η ∈ P(DX) such that η consists of finitely many atoms and L(XτXη ) = ν.
Proof. It follows from the construction in the proof of Lemma 7 that if µ is purely
atomic then so is η.
Lemma 9. Let ν be an element of QX(T ). Then there exist (ηn)n≥1 such that ηn
has finite support for each n and such that L(XτXηn )⇒ ν.
Proof. Since ν ∈ QX(T ) = QX(TR) there exists η such that L(XτXη ) = ν. Let
(ηn)n≥1 be a sequence of measures with finite support such that ηn ⇒ η. Then
for f : [0,∞) 7→ R a bounded continuous test function define f̃ : [0, x] × [x,∞) by
f̃(a, b) = f(a) b−xb−a +f(b)
x−a






η(da, db)f̃(a, b) = E[f(XτXη )]
and it follows that νn := L(XτXηn )⇒ ν.
Theorem 8. Suppose Y is a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion. Suppose the law
invariance property holds (Assumption 2). Suppose that H is quasi-convex and lower
semi-continuous. Then V∗(T ) = V∗(TT ).
Proof. Clearly V∗(T ) ≥ V∗(TT ).
For any µn with finite support we can define νn = µn]s
−1. Then we can find
a measure ηn with finite support such that L(XτXηn ) = νn. Moreover νn can be




































Then, for τ ∈ T , if µ = L(Yτ ) and if µn ⇒ µ
V (τ) = H(µ) ≤ lim supH(µn) ≤ V∗(TT ).
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Hence V∗(T ) ≤ V∗(TT ).
4.6 Extension to other state spaces for the process in
natural scale
4.6.1 The range is unbounded below but bounded above
In this case we may assume that IX = (−∞, 0) or (−∞, 0]. The analysis goes
through almost unchanged except that now X is a convergent sub-martingale and
QX(T ) = Q(TR) = P≥x where P≥x = {ν ∈ P((−∞, 0]) :
∫
zν(dz) ≥ x}.
4.6.2 The range is bounded
Suppose X is bounded. In this case Q(T ) = Q(TR) = P=x where P=x = {ν ∈
P(ĪX) :
∫
zν(dz) = x}. To see this note that X is a uniformly integrable martingale
and not just a super-martingale. Therefore we must have E[Xτ ] = limE[Xτ∧t] = x
and hence Q(T ) ⊆ P=x. Conversely, by the same argument as in Lemma 7, but
this time with v∗ = 0 and ν1 ≡ ν, we deduce that for any ν ∈ P=x there exists a
randomisation η such that L(XτXη ) = ν. It follows that Q(T ) = Q(TR) = P=x.
The proofs of Lemma 8, Lemma 9 and Theorem 7 go through unchanged.
4.6.3 The range is unbounded above and below
Now suppose IX is unbounded above and below. By the Rogozin trichotomy (Ro-
gozin (1996))−∞ = lim inftXt < x < lim suptXt =∞ and limt↑∞Xt does not exist.
In this case we must restrict T to the set of stopping times with P(τ < ∞) = 1.




but we could equiva-
lently write TT = ∪(β,γ)∈D0{τβ,γ}, where D0 = ([−∞, y] ∩ ĪY ) × ([y,∞] ∩ ĪY ) \
{s−1(−∞), s−1(∞)}. We have to exclude the threshold rule τs−1(−∞),s−1(∞) since
τs−1(−∞),s−1(∞) =∞ almost surely and Y∞ is not defined. In terms of threshold rules
τXa,b for X we allow a = −∞ or b =∞ but not both. Then TT = {τβ,γ : (β, γ) ∈ DX0 )}
where DX0 = DX \ {−∞,∞} = [∞, x]× [x,∞] \ {−∞,∞}.
In the definition of randomised threshold rules we can write TR = {τζ : ζ ∈ P(D0)}
where D0 is as above and similarly TR = {τXη : η ∈ P(DX0 )}.
When IX = R we claim that we have QX(T ) = QX(TR) = P(R). Since stopping
times are finite almost surely we must have QX(T ) ⊆ P(R) so it is sufficient to
show that for any ν ∈ P(R) we have ν ∈ QX(TR). Given ν ∈ P(R) let Aν be a
F0-measurable random variable with law ν and set τ = inf{u : Xu = Aν}. Then
L(Xτ ) = L(Aν) = ν.
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The proofs of Lemma 8, Lemma 9 and Theorem 7 go through unchanged.
4.7 Conclusion
In classical optimal stopping problems involving maximizing expected utility the
optimal strategy is a threshold rule and involves stopping the first time that the
process leaves an interval. However, in more general settings the optimal strategy
may be more sophisticated. In some settings, for example those involving regret
(Loomes and Sugden (1982)) the optimal stopping rule may depend on some func-
tional of the path (for example the maximum price to date). But, as argued here, for
a large class of problems the payoff depends only on the distribution of the stopped
process, and then there are many optimal stopping rules, some of which take the
form of randomized threshold rules. In this article we have utilized (an extended
version of) the Hall solution of the Skorokhod embedding problem (Hall (1985)) to
give our randomized threshold rule, but there are other solutions of the Skorokhod
embedding which can also be viewed as mixed threshold rules, including the original
solution of Skorokhod (1965) and the solution of Hirsch et al (2011).
The idea that if the objective is expressed in terms of a function which is not
quasi-convex then agents may want to use randomized strategies is well appreciated
in static settings. In a dynamic setting He et al (2017) argue that in binomial-tree,
probability-weighted model of a casino (Barberis (2014)) gamblers may prefer path-
dependent strategies over strategies which are defined via a partition of the set of
nodes into those at which the gambler stops and those at which he continues. (See
also Ebert and Strack (2016) and Henderson et al (2017) for discussion of a related
optimal stopping problem with probability weighting based on a diffusion process.)
He et al (2017) argue further that the path-dependent strategy can be replaced by
a randomized strategy under which the decision about whether to stop at a node
depends not on the path history but rather the realization of an independent uniform
random variable. This preference for randomization mirrors our result, but takes
a different form. In our perpetual problem the agent chooses a randomized pair of
levels and then follows a threshold strategy based on these levels. In He et al (2017)
a zero-one decision about whether to stop at a node is replaced by a probability of
continuing, and the stopping rules which arise are not randomized threshold rules.
Many optimal stopping models in the economics literature predict that the agent
will stop on first exit from an interval, which necessarily involves stopping either
at the current maximum or the current minimum. If instead, observed behavior
includes stopping at levels which are not equal to one of the running extrema of the
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process then this is evidence against the model (Strack and Viefers (2017) present
experimental evidence from a laboratory game that players do not follow thresh-
old strategies - instead players visit the same price three times on average before
stopping). But, our results imply that the converse is not true. Even if agents only
ever take a decision to sell at a time when the process is at a new maximum or new
minimum, this does not necessarily mean that agents are following a pure threshold
rule. They could have any target distribution, as for example in Proposition 5, but
be realizing this target distribution via a randomized threshold rule.
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Chapter 5
Randomising Rules for Stopping
Problems
5.1 Introduction
In a classical, continuous-time, optimal stopping problem the agent chooses the best
time to stop a stochastic process in order the maximise the expected discounted
return. The agent can choose when to stop and if at any moment they decide to
stop, stopping occurs immediately with probability one. However, in many settings
this is an idealistic oversimplification. There may be many reasons why agents do not
make an unequivocal best choice when choosing between stopping and continuing.
For example, they may be unable to precisely evaluate the value of continuing (or
alternatively have imprecise information about the value of stopping), they may
be unable to put their stopping decision into practice (they may wish to sell, but
find no buyer) or they may have an ulterior motive for not choosing the apparently
best option (perhaps they delay sale to learn more about alternative outcomes).
Following Strack and Viefers (2017) we consider a modification of the problem in
which stopping occurs at a rate which depends on the relative values of stopping
and continuing (i.e. stopping probability at any decision point is given by p = gg+c
with g being the stopping value and c being the perceived continuation value ).
One immediate issue is that if at each instant an agent has a positive probability of
stopping, then since in a continuous-time model there are an uncountable number
of stopping opportunities in any small interval, the agent will end up stopping
immediately. To deal with the first issue, we constrain the agent to stopping at a
countable number of times, namely the event times {T λn }n≥1 of an exogenous Poisson
process. For our purposes the memoryless property of the Poisson process is crucial
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in allowing us to conclude that the value function is a Markovian function of the
state process, which keeps the analysis tractable.
Another issue we need to address is how to define the continuation value. Our
inspiration is a paper by Strack and Viefers (2017) who analyse a stopping decision
under a randomising stopping rule. They take the perceived continuation value as
the value under optimal stopping rule. This situation models an agent who can
determine the optimal stopping rule, but cannot ensure that the optimal rule is
followed exactly; such agent is not sophisticated enough to allow for the fact that
their future self will not behave optimally. The innovation of this thesis is that we
introduce a new type of randomised stopping in which the perceived continuation
value is calculated based on the fact that stopping will be determined by the ran-
domised rule. This models an agent who is aware that their future self is not able to
stop optimally, but rather stops with a randomised rule, and who values the prob-
lem accordingly. This definition introduces non-linear feedback into the valuation
problem.
Nevertheless, we solve the randomised stopping problem for different specifications
of the perceived continuation value. We will also give various alternative characteri-
sations of the solution including a stochastic representation and a representation as
the solution of linear growth of an ordinary differential equation.
Our final set of findings concern the case in which the rate of the Poisson process
describing opportunities to stop increases to infinity. We show that it is possible to
choose the stopping probability in such a way that the problem has a non-degenerate
limit. Then we give a description of a continuous-time stopping problem for which
the value function solves the identical equation to the aforementioned limiting prob-
lem. This newly introduced problem involves stopping at the first event time of an
inhomogeneous stopping time with rate depending on the ratio of the instantaneous
stopping value to the continuation value.
5.2 Problem Specification
Recall the stopping problems described in Chapter 1. Let the asset price process
X = (Xt)t≥0 be a time-homogeneous, continuous, real-valued, strong-Markov pro-
cess with initial value X0 = x, living on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F =
{Ft}) which satisfies the usual conditions. Let g : R 7→ R+ be a (measurable) payoff
function (satisfying suitable growth conditions, so that the problem is well-posed)
and let β be a strictly positive discount factor. The value function w = w(x) of the
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where T is the set of all F−stopping times.
For a constrained optimal stopping problem in which stopping can only occur at
the event times {T λn }n≥1 of an independent Poisson process of rate λ, we assume that
the probability space is rich enough to carry a Poisson Process which is independent
of X, and to carry any other random variables which we wish to define. The value




where T λ is the set of all stopping times taking values in the event times of the
Poisson process.
Now consider the stopping problem under a randomised stopping rule. We assume
that stopping can only occur at event times of a Poisson process. At such an
event time the probability of stopping depends on the value of immediate stopping
g = g(Xt) and on the perceived continuation value c = c(Xt). More precisely, we
suppose there is a map Γ : R+ × R+ 7→ [0, 1] such that the probability of stopping
is p(Xt) = Γ(g(Xt), c(Xt)). To simplify notation, we denote Γ
g,c = Γ(g, c).
We can formalise the stopping rule as follows. Suppose the filtration is also
sufficiently rich to include (Un)n≥1 be a sequence of iid standard uniform random
variables with Ui ∈ [0, 1], which are also independent of X and the Poisson process.
Then, at the nth event time of the Poisson process, the conditional probability of
stopping is P(Un ≤ Γg,c(XTλn )) = Γ
g,c(XTλn ). Define τc = T
λ
N where N = min{n :
Un ≤ Γg,c(XTλn )}. Then, the continuation value of the randomised stopping problem
is
Problem 1 (Stopping Time Formulation (STF)).
G(x) = Ex[e−βτcg(Xτc)]. (5.1)
Integrating against the time of the first event of the Poisson process, and in
analogy to (1.7), we have a second formulation for G in feedback form






dtλe−λte−βt {Γg,c(Xt)g(Xt) + (1− Γg,c(Xt))G(Xt)}
]
. (5.2)
assuming the payoff from immediate stopping is g, the value of continuing is G, and
the probability of continuing is Γg,c where c is the perceived value of continuing.
Another way to characterise G is via differential equation. The corresponding
representation for G is
Problem 3 (Ordinary Differential Equation Formulation (ODEF)). G is of linear
growth and solves
LG(x)− βG(x) + λΓg,c(x) [g(x)−G(x)] = 0, G(0) = 0. (5.3)
The equivalence between (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) are provided by Lemma 10, Lemma 11
and Lemma 12.
There are several possible choices for the perceived continuation value c. We
may take the value of the classical optimal stopping problem w as in Strack and
Viefers (2017). Or, given that stopping is only allowed at event times of the Poisson
process we can take c = h. The novelty in this paper is that we consider the case of a
sophisticated agent whose probability of stopping depends on the true continuation
value and who takes c = G. In this case, since G appears on both sides of (5.1), we
need to to prove that there exists a fixed point, which is provided in Proposition 6.
Then, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we consider solutions to the problem for particular
choices of payoff function. First we consider the case g(x) = x when analytic
solutions are available. Then we present numerical solutions to the problem when
g(x) = (x−K)+ with K = 1.
In Section 5.6 we consider what happens in the limit as λ gets large. We show how
we can obtain a sensible limit by carefully choosing Γ. Also, we obtain a specification
for a continuous time, randomised stopping problem which is non-degenerate.
5.3 The base case
Within the general set-up described above we will mainly work with the following
specification.
For the Markov process X we take exponential Brownian motion started at x:
dXt
Xt
= µdt+ σdWt; X0 = x.
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Then X has generator L = LX given by Lf = 12x
2σ2f ′′ + µxf ′.
We assume the payoff function g is continuous, non-negative, has at most linear
growth, and satisfies g(0) = 0. For well-posedness of the classical optimal stopping
problem we need β > µ and we assume this parameter restriction throughout.
For the probability of stopping map Γ we take Γg,c = gg+c , although later we will
also consider Γg,cξ =
g
g+ξc for some weighting parameter ξ.
As a motivation for this choice of Γ, and indeed of randomised stopping, suppose
the investor is faced with stopping with reward g or continuing with potential reward
c. Suppose however, that there is (multiplicative) measurement error in calculating
the rewards so that the investor bases his decision on values g̃ and c̃ where g̃ = gZg,
c̃ = cZc and {Zg, Zc} are a pair of independent (of everything) exponential random
variables each with unit rate. Suppose the agent makes a rational decision based on
the measured values, in the sense that she stops if g̃ ≥ c̃. Then, the probability of




The value of the randomised stopping problem is bounded above by the value of
the optimal stopping problem (1.1). Since g is of linear growth (and the discount
factor is larger than the mean growth rate) w grows at most linearly. Hence also,
the solution G is also of linear growth.
In this section we concentrate on the extent to which solutions of the stochastic
integral equation (5.2) or of the differential equation (5.3) can be identified with
solutions of the problem (5.1) with randomised stopping, and the existence and
uniqueness of solutions to (5.2) by using fixed point theorem.
Lemma 10. Suppose G is the solution to Problem 1. Then G also solves Problem 2
and vice versa.
Proof. As discussed at the start of Section 5.3, since the payoff function is bounded
by a linear function, so are w, h and the solution to Problem 1.
Let V be the value function of the randomised stopping problem at an instant
when there is stopping opportunity. Then, we have
V (x) = Γg,c(x)g(x) + (1− Γg,c(x))G(x) (5.4)
Conditioning on the first event time T1 of the Poisson process, and using the strong

























dtλe−λte−βt{Γg,c(Xt)g(Xt) + (1− Γg,c(Xt))G(Xt)}
]
.
Lemma 11. Suppose G solves Problem 2. Then G is C∞. Moreover, G solves
Problem 3.
Proof. It is a classical result (see for example Karatzas an Shreve (1991) Problem




∞ for some a > 0, then uF is C∞((0,∞) × (0,∞)) where uF (t, x) is defined by
uF (t, x) = Ex[F (Xt)] =
∫∞
0 F (y)P (t;x, y)dy and P (t;x, y) is the transition density
of a geometric Brownian motion.
Recall that G is of linear growth. Then V defined by (5.4), which is the weighted
average of two functions of linear growth, is also of linear growth. In particular, uV









is also C∞. Furthermore, we can obtain bounds on the derivatives of G, see for
example the proof of Problem 4.3.1 in Karatzas and Shreve [31, p277]. For example,
Ex[X2|G′′(X)|] <∞.
Now we show that G solves (5.3). We follow Pham [47, p43]. For δ > 0, writing
































Let τn = inf{u : Xu /∈ (xn , nx)}. Since G is of class C
∞, we apply Itô’s formula to
e−(β+λ)tG(Xt) to obtain
e−(β+λ)(δ∧τn)G(Xδ∧τn) = G(x) +
∫ δ∧τn
0











= G(x) + Ex
[∫ δ∧τn
0
e−(β+λ)s[LG− (β + λ)G](Xs)ds
]
.
By the linear growth condition of G, we obtain,
e−(β+λ)(δ∧τn)G(Xδ∧τn) ≤ e−(β+λ)(δ∧τn)κXδ∧τn ≤ sup
t≥0
e−(β+λ)tκXt,








for geometric Brownian motion X with drift µ. Moreover, using the smoothness of
G, we obtain
Ex [|LG− (β + λ)G(Xs)|] <∞.





= G(x) + Ex
[∫ δ
0
e−(β+λ)s[LG− (β + λ)G](Xs)ds
]
.







e−(β+λ)s[LG− (β + λ)G](Xs)ds
]




e−(β+λ)s[LG− (β + λ)G+ λV ](Xs)ds
]
. (5.7)
Let F (s) = Ex[e−(β+λ)s{LG− (β + λ)G+ λV }(Xs)] and note that F is continuous
on [0,∞). Dividing both sides of (5.7) by δ and sending δ to 0, we conclude from
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the Mean-Value Theroem that there exists δn ↓ 0 such that F (δn) = 0. Then, by
continuity of F we conclude F (0) = 0, or equivalently LG − (β + λ)G + λV = 0.
And by (5.4), we find
LG− βG+ λΓg,c(g −G) = 0.
Lemma 12. Suppose f = f(x, h) is continuous and of at most linear growth, sup-
pose ε > β and consider the ODE
LH(x)− εH(x) + f(x,H(x)) = 0. (5.8)








Proof. We have H ′′ = 2
σ2x2
{−µxH ′ + εH − f(x,H)} so that H is C2. Then, apply-








where, as before τn := inf{u > 0 : Xu /∈ (xn , nx)}. Since the stopped stochastic











Using the properties of exponential Brownian motion to conclude that Ex[sups≤tXs] <
Cx for some C constant, sending n to infinity, and using dominated convergence











Then, since H is of linear growth and ε > µ, sending t to infinity we conclude
0 = lim
t→∞














Thus, H admits probabilistic representation (5.9).





dtλe−λte−βt {Γg,c(Xt)g(Xt) + (1− Γg,c(Xt))G(Xt)}
]
.
Proposition 6. For each c ∈ {w, h,G} there exists a unique G which has the prob-
abilistic representation (5.2), is of class C2 and satisfys a linear growth condition.
Proof. Denote by (M,d) the metric space
M = {f : (0,∞) 7→ (0,∞), f ∈ C2, 0 < f(x) < κx for some κ ∈ R+},




For c a perceived continuation value define T c : M 7→M by










To see that T c(F ) ∈ M note that T c(F ) is of class C2 by Lemma 11, and since g
and F are of linear growth and g
2+cF
g+c ≤ g + F ,
0 < T (F )(x) ≤ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
λe−(β+λ)t[F (Xt) + g(Xt)]dt
]
≤ κx
where κ is some positive constant.
Next, we show that T c is a contraction mapping. Then, by the Banach fixed point
theorem there exists a unique function m ∈M such that T c(m) = m. Thus there is
a unique solution to Problem 2.
We show d(T c(H1), T
c(H2)) ≤ ρd(H1, H2) with ρ < 1. There are three cases to
consider, namely c = w, c = hλ and c = G. We cover the first two cases together:
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for c = w and c = hλ,



























e−(β+λ)tEx[Xt]dt = ρd(H1, H2)x,



































Theorem 9. Suppose Γg,c = gg+c . Then the solution to any one of the three formu-
lations is the unique solution to all of them.
Proof. Theorem 9 follows immediately from the following results
1. If fSTF is the solution of the stopping problem formulation then fSTF solves
(5.2).
2. If fSFF is of polynomial growth and solves (5.2) then it also solves (5.3).
3. If fODEF is of linear growth and solves (5.3) then it also solves (5.2).
4. There is a unique solution to the Stochastic Formulation with Feedback prob-
lem.
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Note that there will be solutions of (5.2) and (5.3) which are not of linear growth.
These solutions might be identified with bubbles in the sense of Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003). They correspond to solutions of Problems 2 and 3 which involve inter-
nally consistent valuations where the agent’s current over-valuation of the solution
is justified by an overvaluation at future candidate stopping times also. However,
they do not have a representation as a solution of the stopping time formulation.
We will not be concerned with such solutions.
5.4 Linear payoffs
In this section we suppose g(x) = x. Then in the classical optimal stopping problem
it is always optimal to exercise immediately, and w(x) = x. For the problem in
which exercise times are restricted to event times, it’s optimal to stop at the first














where ρ = λλ+β−µ ∈ (0, 1). There are three possible forms for the value of the ran-
domised stopping problem depending on which version of the perceived continuation
value we use. Using Γg,c = gg+c , (5.3) can be rewritten as




5.4.1 Perceived continuation value c = w
In this case, we denote by Gw the continuation value function, then we find from
(5.10) that Gw(x) = ψwx where ψw solves




We find ψw = ρ2−ρ .
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5.4.2 Perceived continuation value c = h
In this case, we denote by Gh the continuation value function, then Gh(x) = ψhx
where ψh solves




We find ψh = ρ
1+ρ−ρ2 .
5.4.3 Perceived continuation value c = G
In this case, the perceived continuation value c coincides with the continuation value
G. We simply use G = GG as the continuation value function, then G(x) = ψGx
where ψG solves











2(1−ρ) , where we take the larger root of (5.23) as
this root lies in (0, 1).
5.4.4 Discussion
We will explain in the discussion why ρ > ψG > ψh > ψw, and this is confirmed
graphically in Figure 5.1.
First observe that as Tλ ⊂ T we must have h ≤ w, and since h is optimal for
stopping at event times of the Poisson process we must have max{Gw, Gh, G} < h.
In the problem with a linear payoff it is always optimal to stop as soon as possible
both in the classical optimal stopping problem, and in the stopping problem in which
stopping times are restricted to be event times of the Poisson process. This remains
true in the randomised stopping problem, to the extent that the problem value is
maximised if the probability of stopping is maximised. Since the probability of
stopping gg+c is maximised when c is minimised, it follows from the inequalities G <
h < w that the value functions have order G > Gh > Gw. Hence, ψG > ψh > ψw.
Further, all these valuations are dominated by the case of optimal stopping where
stopping times are constrained to be event times of the Poisson process, and so
ψG < ρ.
For all specifications of continuation value, ψc has limiting values ψc(0+) = 0
and ψc(1−) = 1. When λ is very small, T1 is likely to be large, e−βT1XT1 is small
with large probability, and the value function is small. Conversely, if β−µ is small,
E[e−βTλkXTλk ] is close to unity. Although, the agent would benefit most from stopping
at each and every opportunity, the losses from not stopping are not great.
66
Figure 5.1: A plot of ψw, ψh and ψG as functions of ρ, as well as the line y(ρ) = ρ.
Note that for g(x) = x we have h(x) = ρx and Gc(x) = ψcx.
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Note that ψc is increasing in ρ for each c ∈ {w, h,G}. This corresponds to the
value function being increasing in λ. Consider first the case c = w. As λ increases,
there are more chances to stop. Since w does not depend on λ, the probability of
stopping, conditional on an opportunity to stop, does not depend on λ. Hence, a
simple coupling argument gives that as λ increases the stopping time gets smaller
and therefore the value function increases. Now consider the case c = h. As λ
increases, there are more opportunities to stop. However, h is increasing in λ, and
so at each opportunity to stop the agent is less likely to stop. This second factor
is less significant than the first, and overall the rate of stopping λΓ(x, h) goes up.
Hence ψh is increasing in λ. Finally suppose c = G. Again, increasing λ increases
the stopping opportunities which has the impact of increasing the value function.
However, this reduces the probability of stopping, which has the effect of reducing
the size of any increase in value function, but not to the extent of preventing overall
increases.
5.5 Call payoffs
Our goal in this section is to move beyond linear payoffs to call payoffs. In particular
we will assume g(x) = (x − K)+. By a scaling argument it is possible to reduce
the case of general strike to unit strike, and in all our numerical examples we will
assume K = 1, but for the present we allow general K. Section 2 provides explicit
formulae for w in (2.8).
5.5.1 Explicit formula for h
We can solve for h by noting that it is optimal to stop at (t,Xt) if and only if there
is an event of the Poisson process and h(Xt) ≤ (Xt −K). We expect that there is
a critical value Lλ such that it is optimal to stop at (t,Xt) if and only if Xt > L
λ.
Then we have Lh − βh = 0 for x ≤ Lλ and Lh − (β + λ)h + λg = 0 for x ≥ Lλ
(See Dupis and Wang (2005)). We have value matching and smooth fit at x = Lλ,
and from the fact that Lλ separates the stopping and continuation regions, we have
h(Lλ) = g(Lλ) = (Lλ −K)+. We find
h(x) =








































Note that limλ↑∞ γ = −∞ and hence limλ↑∞ Lλ = L∗. Note further that limλ↑∞C =
1
θ−1K(L
∗)−θ = 1θ (L
∗)1−θ where we use L∗ = θθ−1K and similarly limλ↑∞C1 = 0,
and moreover C1x
γ → 0 for fixed x. Hence limλ↑∞ h(x) = w(x).
5.5.2 Perceived continuation value c = w
The first randomised stopping problem we consider is for the case where the contin-
uation value is the value of the problem with no restrictions on the exercise time.
By (5.3), we have
LGw − (β + λ)Gw + λg
2 + wGw
g + w
= 0, x ∈ (0,∞), (5.14)
For x ∈ (0,K), we have g(x) = 0 and thus Gw satisfies
LGw − βGw = 0, x ∈ (0,K). (5.15)
Recall that L∗ = θθ−1K. For x ∈ [L
∗,∞), we have w(x) = g(x) and thus Gw satisfies





g = 0, x ∈ [L∗,∞). (5.16)
The general solution to (5.15) is
Gw(x) = Bxθ +B0x
θ0
where θ and θ0 are given by (2.4) and (2.5) respectively. From the boundary condi-
tion Gw(0+) = 0 we must have B0 = 0.
Similarly, the general solution to LGw − (β + λ2 )G
w = 0 is given by Gw(x) =
B3x
α+ + B4x
















A particular solution to (5.16) is given by
Gw(x) =
λ








Since the solution Gw we are looking for is of linear growth rate, we require B3 = 0
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and it follows that for x ∈ (L∗,∞)




for a constant B4 to be determined.
The goal is to construct a C2 solution for Gw on (0,∞). Fix a solution for Gw on
(0,K) by fixing B1. We can use value matching and smooth fit at K to give values
for Gw and it’s first derivative at K and hence to construct a (numerical) solution
to (5.14) on [K,L∗). Value matching at L∗ can be used to construct a solution to
(5.16) on (L∗,∞), and in particular to fix B4 in (5.17). In general there will be no
first order smooth fit at L∗. However, by adjusting B1 we can construct a solution
which is C1 at K and L∗ and hence C1 on (0,∞). This is the solution we want.
Note that if we set g = 0 at x = K then (5.14) reduces to (5.15), and if we set
g = w at x = L∗ then (5.14) reduces to (5.16). As a result, if we have a solution
which is C1 at K and L∗ then the second derivatives also match at these points,
and our C1 solution is actually C2.
5.5.3 Perceived continuation value c = h
Now suppose we take as the continuation value the value of the game under optimal
stopping when the stopping opportunities are the event times of a Poisson Process,
rate λ. We have that Gh satisfies
LGh − (β + λ)Gh + λg
2 + hGh
g + h
= 0 x ∈ (0,∞), (5.18)
where h is given by (5.12). Note that g changes form at K and h changes form
at Lλ so that (5.18) can usefully be split into three regions. As in the previous
case, the boundary condition at 0+ is such that the solution on (0,K] takes the
form Gh(x) = Dxθ for some constant D. Temporarily fixing D, value matching and
first-order smooth fit at K allows us to construct a solution on [K,∞). We want the
solution for which lim G
h(x)
x = ψ
h; we adjust D until this is the case. Again, since g
and h are continuous at K and Lλ, the C1 solution from (5.18) is automatically C2.
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5.5.4 Perceived continuation value c = G
We distinguish between the two regions for (5.3),
LG− βG = 0, x ∈ (0,K) (5.19)
LG− (β + λ)G+ λg
2 +G2
g +G
= 0, x ∈ [K,∞). (5.20)
The general solution to (5.19) on (0,K) is given by G(x) = Exθ for some constant
E. Fixing E and using value matching and first order smooth fit we can construct
(numerically) a C1 solution for G on (0,∞). Finally, we can adjust E until we




5.5.5 Comparison of the different solutions
Figure 6.14 plots the various value functions w, h, Gw, Gh and G together with the
payoff g(x) = (x − 1)+. w is the largest of the value functions, reflecting the fact
that stopping is unrestricted, and that stopping is optimal. Next largest is h which
involves optimal stopping from the event times of the Poisson process: optimality
means that h ≥ max{Gw, Gh, G}.
Since w > h, when we compare the stopping probability for randomised stop-
ping under continuation value w compared with that of h we expect to stop less
frequently. In general, discounting means that above and not too close to the strike
it is beneficial to stop sooner. Hence Gh > Gw. (Below the strike g ≡ 0, and the
probability of stopping is zero. Just above the strike, stopping is more common for
c = h than for c = w, and stopping is sub-optimal in this case; nonetheless, this
regime is small and Gh > Gw.)
Similar reasoning justifies why G < h leads to G > Gh. From Figure 6.14 we
see that h − G  w − h and from this we expect that G − Gh  Gh − Gw, where
by  we mean much smaller than in a qualitative sense. Again the evidence from
Figure 6.14 supports this conclusion.
Figure 5.3 shows the impact of increased stopping opportunities and shows the
value function as a function of x for various values of λ. Surprisingly, in general the
value function is non-monotonic in λ. For large values of x (see panel (a)) we have
that G(x) is monotonic in λ: for large x it is always optimal to stop and hence more
stopping opportunities are beneficial (recall that asymptotically G(x)x → ψ
G and
ψG is monotonic in λ, Figure 5.1). However, this monotonicity does not propagate
to all values of x. For x close to the strike (see Panel (b)) the value function is
non-monotonic. This reflects the multiple impacts of increasing λ; it increases the
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Figure 5.2: The value functions depicted are based the parameter set :
(β, µ, σ,K, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 1); w > h > G > Gh > Gw always holds.
stopping opportunities and hence also the rate of stopping. Near the strike, since
stopping is worse than continuing, more stopping can reduce the value function.
Overall, the impact of increasing the rate stopping opportunities is ambiguous.
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Figure 5.3: In the top plot, the value functions are seen to be increasing in λ for
large x. In the bottom plot, we see that this monotonicity does not hold for λ near
the strike. Other parameters are (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1)
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5.5.6 Realised rate of stopping
The probability of stopping at each price level of X is expressed using Γ, and is
plotted in Figure 5.4.
The vertical dash-dot lines in Figure 5.4 represent the critical thresholds Lλ which
divide the continuation regions from the stopping regions in the optimal stopping
problem in which stopping can only occur at event times of the Poisson process. We
see that these critical thresholds are increasing in λ, and that they increase to L∗
(represented by the vertical dash-dot line labelled λ = ∞). The curves represent
the probability of stopping Γg,G(x) = g(x)g(x)+G(x) .
As we can see from Figure 5.4, for fixed λ, the probability of stopping is increasing
in x and converges to a constant. For large x, we have Γ ≥ 0.5 since g ≥ h ≥ G.
Moreover, we can see from Figure 5.4 that Γ is monotone decreasing in λ when
x is large but loses the monotonicity when x is smaller. Again, this reflects the
non-monotonicity of G in λ.
Figure 5.4: The stopping probability as a function of x, for varying λ. (β, µ, σ,K) =
(5, 3, 2, 1); The vertical dash-dot represents the optimal stopping level for h when
λ = 1, λ = 10, λ = 100 and λ = 1000 respectively (from left to right.); Γg,G = gg+G
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5.6 Towards a model of continuous stopping
5.6.1 Modification of the randomising stopping rule
If we assume that the probability of stopping (conditional on an event of the Poisson
process) is a constant p > 0, independent of Xt, (which is the case when the payoff
is linear or equivalently when the strike price K is 0), then the time of stopping is
an exponentially distributed random variable with rate pλ. Then, as opportunities
to stop come faster and faster (λ→∞), the time of stopping converges to 0, almost
surely. Without modification to our model, if stopping opportunities become more
and more frequent, then in the limit the randomising stopping rule will be degenerate
and will involve stopping immediately wherever g > 0.
In order to avoid this degenerate limit we consider biasing the continuation
probability towards continuing: we modify the stopping probability (previously
Γ(g, c) = gg+c) to




where ξ is a positive constant which we will specify in Section 5.6.2. As in Section 5.4,
in the case of linear payoffs we can derive exact expressions for the value function:
these take the form V cξ (x) = ψ
c
λ,ξx. For c = w, ψ
w
λ,ξ solves






1 + ξ − ξρ
. (5.21)
For c = h, ψhλ,ξ solves






1 + ξρ− ξρ2
, (5.22)
For c = G, ψGλ,ξ solves
µψx− (β + λ)ψx+ λ1 + ξψ
2
1 + ξψ














Figure 5.5 shows the impact of varying ξ. We can see that the values of linear
payoffs are decreasing in ξ. Increasing ξ decreases the probability of stopping for all
cases, and since stopping is optimal everywhere, discounting reduces the value of the
payoff. Hence ψcλ,ξ is decreasing in ξ for c ∈ {w, h,G}. Moreover, since G < h < w









λ,ξ as functions of ξ.
5.6.2 Making ξ dependent on λ
Now we consider the impact of varying λ and ξ in a systematic manner. Suppose
c(x) = κg(x) for some constant κ (for example, if g(x) = x we find c(x) = κx for
some κ.) Then Γξ(g, c) =
1
1+ξκ is independent of x, and the rate of stopping is
λ
1+κξ . We want to choose λ ↑ ∞, ξ ↑ ∞ in such a way that the rate of stopping
converges to a non-trivial rate. In particular we want to choose ξ = ξ(λ) such that
limλ↑∞
λ
1+κξ(λ) exists in (0,∞). Then, as opportunities to stop (from the Poisson
process) become universal, the probability of stopping (in a fixed and finite time
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interval [0, Tε]) converges to a probability in (0, 1).
Motivated by this heuristic we take ξ = λη for η ∈ (0,∞). Then λΓ(g, c) =
ηλg
ηg+λc .
In Figure 5.6 we plot ψc
λ,λ
η
as a function of η for c ∈ {w, h,G}. We see that as η






λ,λ/η and the first two are
almost indistinguishable for even moderately large values of η.
Figure 5.6: ψcλ,λ/η as a function of η. (β, µ, σ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1).
Our main interest is in fixing η and letting both λ and ξ = λη get large. The
values of ψc are plotted as functions of λ in Figure 5.7. Again we see ψGλ,λ/η >
ψhλ,λ/η > ψ
w







converge to the same limit. This
is because, as λ increases to infinity hλ converges to w and so the continuation value
is the same for these two specifications. However, this is a limiting result, and when




λ,λ/η, recovering the result
of Section 5.5.5.
77
Figure 5.7: Under the new rule Γξ for ξ = λ/η, we find limλ↑∞ ψ
G
λ,λ/η < 1. From
top to bottom, η = 0.1, 1, 10 respectively
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Then k∗c describes the value function (in the limit of large λ) for linear payoffs in




cx. By letting λ and ξ tend
to infinity simultaneously we have obtained a non-degenerate limit. The limiting
case λ = ∞ corresponds to a continuous flow of stopping opportunities, but with
a non-trivial probability of stopping in each fixed interval [0, T ]. In particular,
Gλ = Gλ,ξ=λ/η,c solves 0 =
{
LGλ − βGλ + λΓλ/η(g, c)(g −Gλ)
}
= LGλ − βGλ +
ληg(g−G
λ)
ηg+λc . Assuming G
c
η = limλ↑∞G
λ,ξ=λ/η,c exists and that we can swap the order
of taking limits and differentiation we obtain that Gcη solves







For the case where the strike price is 0 (i.e. g(x) = x), the above ODE can be solved




c given by (5.25)-(5.27).
Figure 5.8 shows the convergence of Gη,λ by sending λ to infinity.
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Figure 5.8: (β, µ, σ,K, η) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 1); the dash-dot line represents Gη; the black-
dot is the numerical solution to (5.28) in the case c = G; we can see that the dash-dot
line and the black-dot line are parallel; Gη,λ is increasing in λ and the slopes of Gη,λ
converges to that of Gη when λ gets large
5.6.3 Alternative formulation of the limiting case
In this section we propose a problem in continuous time in which the value function
solves the same equation as that derived in the previous section, and hence represents
a candidate continuous-time randomised stopping problem.
Suppose stopping opportunities occur as events of a time-inhomogeneous Poisson







and that the option is exercised at every stopping opportunity. Here, as always, c is
the continuation value, and in this model the rate of stopping depends on the ratio
of the instantaneous payoff to the continuation value. Note that we identify stop-
ping opportunities via an inhomogeneous Poisson process rather than by thinning
a homogeneous Poisson process of rate λ. But h is the value function under the
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assumption that there is a homogeneous Poisson process. Hence it does not makes
much sense to consider c = h. Therefore, we will focus the two cases of c ∈ {w,G}.













By analogy with the results in the previous section we assume that (5.30) has a
unique solution, and that this solution is the unique solution of linear growth to the
the ordinary differential equation
LG(x)− [β + Λ(x)]G(x) + Λ(x)g(x) = 0. (5.31)
Substituing for Λ in (5.31) we find thatG solves (5.28). (This justifies why we have
used the same notation G = Gcη for the value function in both Section 5.6.2 and in
this section.) Thus, we have another interpretation for the continuous case (λ→∞)
under the biased randomising stopping rule Γξ=λ/η. This agent is employing a
strategy of stopping at the first event time of an inhomogeneous Poisson process





If g(x) = x then it is always optimal to exercise immediately and w(x) = x. Then,
in the case c = w it follows from trying the candidate G(x) = kx in (5.31) that




w is given by (5.25). Similarly, in the case c = G we find




G is given by (5.27).
Since GGη (x) < w(x) we find Λ
G
η (·) > Λwη (·) and hence when the continuation
value is given by G we stop sooner than when the continuation value is given by w.




Now we suppose g(x) = (x − 1)+ and consider numerical solutions of (5.31). The
solutions GGη and G
w





Furthermore, see Figure 5.9, GGη is increasing in η. This is because, certainly when
x is large, it is advantageous to stop, and the stopping rate increases as η increases.
The picture for Gw as a function of η is very similar.
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Figure 5.9: (β, µ, σ) = (5, 3, 2). GGη as a function of η. We see that G
G
η is increasing
in η. We find a similar picture for Gwη .
In Figure 5.10 we compare GGη with G
w
η . When η = 0.1 or η = 1.0 we find
GG(x) > Gw(x) for all values of x. However, when η = 10 there is no universal
relationship between GGη and G
w
η . We still find that G
G
η (x) > G
w
η (x) for large x,
but for small x the inequality is reversed. As we have found elsewhere, the feedback
element implicit in the definition of GG means that an increased value function
increases the stopping rate, which can lower the value function in the region where
g is small and stopping is not beneficial.
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Figure 5.10: (β, µ, σ) = (5, 3, 2). A comparison of the value functions GGη and G
w
η
when η = 10. For large xGGη > G
w
η ; for small x (see the second graph), we find





In the paradigm of randomising stopping rule, stochastic behaviours are derived from
the model setup that stopping does not happen with probability one. The agents
may not be sophisticated enough to compute the continuation value, and thus, are
unable to make an unequivocal choice between stopping and continuing. Therefore,
stopping probability at each decision point is based a stopping rule that takes into
account the current stopping value and perceived continuation. We innovate the
idea that the agent is aware of his future stochastic behaviours and is capable of
computing the continuation value accordingly. This definition introduces non-linear
feedback into the value function. Moreover, stopping can only happen at the event
time of an exogenous Poisson process. This assumption is essential to avoid the
degenerate case where stopping occurs immediately if stopping is allowed at any
instant. However, we are able to analyse the limit case where the event of the Poisson
process comes infinitely fast (or equivalently, stopping opportunity is available at
any instant) by using a biased randomising stopping rule. And we have alternative
interpretation for the agents’ behaviours in the limit case: the agents will stop at the
next event time of a Poisson process whose instant rate is dependent of the relative
value of the current stopping and continuation value. In contrast to our dynamic
CSC model where randomisation is not an assumption, the stochastic behaviour in






Implicit in the classical version of the stopping problem defined in (1.1) and discussed
in Chapter 2 is the idea that the agent can sell the asset (decide to invest, exercise
the option) at any moment of their choosing, and for financial assets traded on
an exchange this is a reasonable assumption. However, for other classes of assets,
including those described as ‘real assets’ by, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
this assumption may be less plausible. Therefore, in this chapter, we assume that
the agent can only complete the sale if they can find a buyer, and candidate buyers
are only available at certain isolated instants of time.
In this work we model the arrival of candidate purchasers as the event times of a
Poisson process. When a candidate purchaser arrives the agent can choose to sell to
that purchaser, or not; if a sale occurs then the problem terminates, otherwise the
candidate purchaser is lost, and the problem continues. If the Poisson process has
a constant rate, then the analysis falls into the framework studied by Dupuis and
Wang (2005) and Lempa (2007).
Dupuis and Wang (2005) and Lempa (2007) discuss optimal stopping problems,
but closely related is the work of Rogers and Zane (2000) in the context of portfolio
optimisation. Rogers and Zane consider an optimal investment portfolio problem
under the hypothesis that the portfolio can only be rebalanced at event times of a
Poisson process of constant rate, see also Pham and Tankov (2008) and Ang, Pa-
panikolaou and Westerfield (2014). The study of optimal stopping problems when
the stopping times are constrained to be event times of an exogenous process is
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relatively unexplored, but Guo and Liu (2005) study a problem in which the aim
is to maximise a payoff contingent upon the maximum of an exponential Brow-
nian motion and Menaldi and Robin (2016) extend the analysis of Dupuis and
Wang (2005) to consider non-exponential inter-arrival times. As a generalisation
of optimal stopping, Liang and Wei (2016) consider an optimal switching problem
when the switching times are constrained to be event times of a Poisson process.
In this article we consider a more sophisticated model of optimal stopping under
constraints in which the agent may expend effort in order to increase the frequency
of the arrival times of candidate buyers. (Note that the problem remains an optimal
stopping problem, since at each candidate sale opportunity the agent optimises
between continuing and selling.) In our model the agent’s instantaneous effort rate
Et affects the instantaneous rate Λt of the Poisson process, so that the candidate sale
opportunities become the event times of an inhomogeneous Poisson process, where
the agent chooses the rate. However, this effort is costly, and the agent incurs a cost
per unit time which depends on the instantaneous effort rate. The objective of the
agent is to maximise the expected discounted payoff net of the expected discounted
costs. In particular, if X = (Xt)t≥0 with X0 = x is the asset price process, g is the
payoff function, β is the discount factor, E = (Et)t≥0 is the chosen effort process,
Λ = (Λt)t≥0 given by Λt = Ψ(Et) is the instantaneous rate of the Poisson process,
CE is the cost function so that the cost incurred per unit time is CE(Et), and TΛ is
the set of event times of a Poisson process, rate Λ, then the objective of the agent









over admissible effort processes E and TΛ-valued stopping times τ . Our goal is to
solve for the value function, the optimal stopping time and the optimal effort, as
represented by the optimal control process E. In fact, typically it is possible to use
the rate of the Poisson process as the control variable by setting C(Λt) = CE(Et) =
CE ◦Ψ−1(Λt). In the context of the problem it is natural to assume that Ψ and CE
are increasing functions, so that Ψ−1 exists, and C is increasing.
Our focus is on the case where X is an exponential Brownian motion, but the
general case of a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion can be reduced to this case at
the expense of slightly more complicated technical conditions. See Lempa [34] for a
discussion in the constant arrival rate case. We begin by rigorously stating the form
of the problem we will study. Then we proceed to solve for the effort process and
stopping rule in (6.1). It turns out that there are two distinctive cases depending
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on the shape of C or more precisely on the finiteness or otherwise of limλ↑∞
C(λ)
λ .
Note that it is not clear a priori what shape C = CE ◦Ψ−1 should take, beyond the
fact that it is increasing. Generally one might expect an increasing marginal cost
of effort (convex CE) and a law of diminishing returns to effort (concave Ψ) which
would correspond to a convex C. But a partial reverse is also conceivable: effort
expended below a threshold has little impact, and it is only once effort has reached
a critical threshold that extra effort readily yields further stopping opportunities; in
this case Ψ would be convex and C might be concave.
One outcome of our analysis is that the agent exerts effort to create a positive
stopping rate only if they are in the region where stopping is optimal. Outside
this region, they typically exert no effort, and there are no stopping opportunities.
Typically therefore, (although we give a counterexample in an untypical case) the
agent stops at the first occasion where stopping is possible and the optimal stopping
element of the problem is trivial.
6.2 The set-up
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F = (Ft)t≥0) which satisfies the
usual conditions and which supports a Brownian motion and an independent Poisson
process. On this space there is a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion process X =
(Xt)t≥0 driven by the Brownian motion. We will assume that X is exponential
Brownian motion with volatility σ and drift µ and has initial value x; then
dXt
Xt
= σdWt + µdt, X0 = x.
Here µ and σ are constants with µ < β. The agent has a perpetual option with
increaing payoff g : R+ 7→ R+ of linear growth. In our examples g is an American
call: g(x) = (x−K)+. Then, in the classical setting, the problem of the agent would
be to maximise E[e−βτg(Yτ )] over stopping times τ . Note that the linear growth
condition, together with µ < β, is sufficient to ensure that this classical problem is
well-posed.
We want to introduce finite liquidity into this problem, in the sense that we want
to incorporate the phenomena that in order to sell the agent needs to find a buyer,
and such buyers are in limited supply. In the simplest case buyers might arrive at
event times of a time-homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ, and then at each
event time of the Poisson process the agent faces a choice of whether to sell to this
buyer at this moment or not; if yes then the sale occurs and the optimal stopping
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problem terminates, if no then the buyer is irreversibly lost, and the optimal stopping
problem continues. We want to augment this problem to allow the agent to expend
effort (via networking, research or advertising) in order to increase the flow of buyers.
There is a cost of searching in this way — the higher the effort the higher the rate
of candidate stopping times but also the higher the search costs. Note that once
the asset is sold, effort expended on searching ceases, and search costs thereafter are
zero by fiat.
Let AE be the set of admissible effort processes. We assume that E ∈ AE if
E = (Et)t≥0 is an adapted process such that Et ∈ IE for all t ∈ [0,∞) where
IE ⊂ R+ is an interval which is independent of time. Then, since Λt = Ψ(Et) we
find E ∈ AE if and only if Λ ∈ A where Λ ∈ A if Λ is adapted and Λt ∈ I for all
t where I = Ψ(IE). Note that I is an interval in R+, and we take the lower and
upper endpoints to be λ and λ respectively.
Recall that TΛ is the set of event times of an inhomogeneous Poisson process with
rate Λ. Then TΛ = {TΛ1 , TΛ2 , . . .} where 0 < TΛ1 and TΛn < TΛn+1 almost surely. Let
T (TΛ) be the set of TΛ-valued stopping times and let A be the set of admissible rate













together with the optimal rate function Λ∗ = (Λ∗t )t≥0 and optimal stopping rule
τ∗ ∈ T (TΛ).
In addition to the set of admissible controls, we also consider the subset of in-
tegrable controls I ⊆ A where Λ ∈ I = I(I, C) is an adapted process with
Λt ∈ I for which Ex[
∫∞
0 e





< ∞ for any admissible Λ and any stopping rule, and hence there
is no loss of generality in restricting the search for the optimal rate function to the
set of integrable controls.
The stopping rule is easily identified in feedback form. Let T 0Λ = TΛ ∪{0} and let














Then, it is optimal to stop immediately if and only if the value of stopping is at
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least as large as the value of continuing and
H0(x) = max{g(x), H(x)}.
It follows that if Λ = (Λt)t≥0 is a fixed admissible rate process, and if H
0
Λ and HΛ
denote the respective value functions then, writing T1 = T
Λ
1 for the first event time








































































and this is the problem we aim to solve. Writing Λ∗ for the optimal rate process we








s)ds (Λ∗t {g(Xt) ∨H(Xt)} − C(Λ∗t )) dt
]
.
Note that H0Λ ≤ H0 and the equality is attained by Λ∗.
6.2.1 Some results for classical problems
For future reference we record some results for classical problems in which agents
can stop at any instant.




(Imagine a standard, perpetual, American-style call option with strike K, though
valuation is not taking place under the equivalent martingale measure.) Classical
arguments (McKean (1965), Peskir and Shiryaev (2006)) give that 0 < wK < x (the
upper bound holds since we are assuming β > µ) and that there exists a constant
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(x−K)+, x > L;
(L−K)L−θxθ, 0 < x ≤ L.
















. Then φ < 0 < 1 < θ and
θ and φ are the roots of Q0 = 0 where Qλ(ψ) =
1
2σ












(Imagine a perpetual, American-style call option with strike K, in which the agent
pays a fee or transaction cost ε to exercise the option, and pays a running cost δ per
unit time until the option is exercised.) Note that wK,0,0 ≡ wK . It turns out that
there are two cases.
In the first case of ε ≥ δ/β, when X is small it is more cost effective to pay the
running cost indefinitely than to pay the exercise fee. We find
wK,ε,δ(x) = w
K+ε−δ/β(x)− δ/β.






In the second case of ε < δ/β, when X is small and the option is out-of-money, it
is cost-effective to stop immediately, even though the payoff is zero, because paying
the fee is cheaper than paying the running cost indefinitely. Thus, we have
v(x) = −ε, x ∈ (0, l∗)
for some l∗ = l∗ε,δ < K to be determined. On the other hand, when X is large and
the option is in-the-money, the payoff of stopping is again larger than the value of
continuing. Thus, we have
v(x) = x−K − ε, x ∈ (L∗,∞)
for some L∗ = L∗ε,δ > K to be determined. Thus the stopping region is S =
(0, l∗) ∪ (L∗,∞). And the continuation region is C = (l∗,  L∗) and we have,
Lv(x)− βv(x) = δ, x ∈ (l∗,  L∗).
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The value of l∗ and L∗ can be determined by smooth-fit principle. Define stopping
time τ∗ = inf{t > 0;Xt /∈ (l∗,  L∗)}. The proof of the optimality of τ∗ and v = wK,ε,δ
is similar to the proof in Theorem 1.
Returning to our problem with limited stopping opportunities, one immediate
observation is that H(x) ≤ wK(x). Conversely, if Λ ≡ 0 is admissible then H(x) ≥
−C(0)β .
6.3 Cost functions
In this section, we list several different types of cost functions that we will discuss
in the following sections.
In Section 6.4.1 and Section 6.4.3, we present the optimal control when the cost
function is quadratic, that is
C(λ) = a+ bλ+ c
λ2
2
with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and c > 0. And we include numerical analysis for the special case
where a = 0 = b.
In Section 6.5, we prove the optimal control when the cost function is concave.




In Section 6.6, we provide further numerical analysis on stopping behaviours under
various cost functions. More specifically, we include
• C0(λ) = cλ
2
2
• Cb(λ) = cλ
2
2 + bλ
• C1(λ) = cλ
2
2 + a
• C>(λ) = cλ
2
2 + aI{λ>0}
6.4 Quadratic cost functions
6.4.1 Heuristics
From the Markovian structure of the problem we expect that the (unknown) value
function H and optimal rate function Λ∗ are time-homogeneous functions of the
asset price only.
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and let LX denote the generator of X so that LXf = σ22 f
′′ + µf ′. Assume that the












We expect that MΛ is a super-martingale for any choice of Λ, and a martingale for







Let C̃ : R+ 7→ R be the concave conjugate of C so that C̃(z) = infλ≥0{C(λ)− λz}.
Then we find that H solves
LXH − βH − C̃(H0 −H) = 0, (6.4)
and a best choice of rate function is Λ∗t = Λ
∗(Xt) where
Λ∗(x) = Θ(H0(x)−H(x)) (6.5)
and Θ(z) = arginfλ{C(λ) − λz}. Note that H0 −H = (g −H)+ and that (6.4) is
a second order differential equation and will have multiple solutions. The bound-
ary behaviour near zero and infinity will determine which solution fits the optimal
stopping problem.
6.4.2 First Example
Suppose g(x) = (x − K)+ for fixed K > 0. Using terminology from the study of
American options and optimal stopping we say that if Xt > K then the process is
in-the-money, if Xt < K then the process is out-of-the-money and the region in the
domain of X where Λ∗(X) is zero is the continuation region C, and S := R+ \ C is
the selling region.
Suppose λ = 0 and λ =∞, then the range of possible values for the rate process
is I = [0,∞] and consider a quadratic cost function C(λ) = a+ bλ+ cλ22 with a ≥ 0,
b ≥ 0 and c > 0. Then, we have










Consider first the behaviour of the value function near zero. If a = 0 then C(0) = 0,
and when X is close to zero the agent may choose not to search for buyers, a strategy
which incurs zero cost. There is little chance of the process ever being in-the-money,
but nonethelesss the agent delays sale indefinitely. We expect that the continuation
region is (0, L∗) for some threshold L∗.
Now suppose a > 0. Now there is a cost to delaying the sale, even when Λ = 0.
If X is small then it is preferable to sell the asset even though the process is out-
of-the-money, because in our problem there are no search costs once the asset is
sold. In this case we expect the agent to search for buyers when X is small, in
order to reduce further costs. Then the continuation region will be (`∗, L∗) for some
0 < `∗ < K < L∗ <∞.
Consider now the behaviour for large x. In this case we can look for an expansion





for constants A1, A1/2 and A0 to be determined. Using the fact that H(x) ≤ wK(x)
so that H is of at most linear growth. The reason we expect there is a square-root
term of x is due to the fact that A1/2
√
x becomes a linear term of x after taking
the square on the right-hand-side of (6.7). Moreover, we expect A1 = 1 so that the
quadratic terms of x cancels on the right-hand-side of (6.7). By plugging (6.8) into
(6.7) and setting the coefficients of x and
√















+ . . . (6.9)
Numerical results (see Figure 6.1) show that this expansion is very accurate for large
x.
Purely quadratic cost: a = 0 = b
In this case we expect that the continuation region is (0, L∗) for a threshold level
L∗ to be determined. For a general threshold L, and writing HL for the solution to
(6.4) with H(0) = 0 and H(L) = L−K we find that HL solves
LXh− βh = 1
2c
({g − h}+)2, (6.10)
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and then that HL(x) =
L−K
Lθ
xθ on x ≤ L. On (L,∞), HL solves (6.10) subject to
HL(L) = (L−K) and H ′L(L) = θ
L−K
L . This procedure gives us a family (HL)L≥K
of potential value functions, each of which is C1. Finally we can determine the
threshold level L by choosing the value L∗ for which HL∗ has linear growth at
infinity.
The linear growth solution HL∗ is shown in Figure 6.1, both for large x and for
moderate x. From We also see that the expansion for H given in (6.9) gives a good
approximation of our numerical solution for large x.
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Figure 6.1: (β, µ, σ,K, a, b, c) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2). In both sub-figures the solid
curved line represents HL∗ ; the straight line represents g ∨ HL∗ on {x : g(x) ≥
HL∗(x)} and the dashed line in the top sub-figure is the expansion for H in (6.9).
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1.35
Figure 6.2: (β, µ, σ,K, a, b, c) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2); this figure plots the optimal con-
trol Λ∗ given by (6.5) as a function of wealth level x. The optimal threshold is seen
to be at L∗ = 1.35.
Figure 6.2 we see that the continuation region is C = (0, 1.35) and that the
stopping region S = [1.35,∞). We see that Λ∗ is zero on the continuation region
C and that Λ∗ is increasing and concave on the stopping region S. The agent
behaves rationally in the sense that on the continuation region where continuing is
worth more than stopping, the agent is unwilling to stop and this is reflected by
the minimal efforts spent on searching (i.e. Λ∗(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ C); similarly, on the
stopping region, stopping is getting more and more valuable relative to continuing
as the price process gets deeper in-the-money, and the agent is incentivised to spend
more effort on searching for stopping opportunities.
The analysis on varying parameters is presented as follow.
Cost coefficient c
We can see that from Figure 6.3 that both the value function HL∗ and the optimal
stopping threshold L∗ are getting smaller as the cost coefficient increases. Figure 6.4
shows that for small x, the agent spends more efforts on searching for trading op-
portunities when the cost coefficient is larger. This phenomenon results from the
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fact that agents with higher cost coefficients have a smaller stopping threshold; on
the other hand, for large x, the agent spends less efforts on searching trading oppor-
tunities (choosing a smaller rate for the Poisson process) when the cost coefficient
is larger. This is due to the fact that larger cost coefficient makes it more costly for
searching, and hence the larger cost makes the optimal control smaller.
Figure 6.3: These solid lines depicts the value function HL∗ under different cost
coefficient c; the dashed line represents g(x); (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1); the optimal
stopping threshold is indicated by the crosspoint of each solid line with the dashed
line.
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Figure 6.4: The optimal controls Λ∗ under different cost coefficients c.
Discount factor β
We can see from Figure 6.5 that the value function HL∗ and the optimal stopping
threshold L∗ are getting smaller as the discounting coefficient increases. Figure 6.6
shows that the agent spends more efforts on searching (choosing larger rate for
Poisson process) given a larger discounting factor. This phenomenon is due to the
fact that continuing becomes less valuable as as β increases. The agent has incentive
to spend more efforts on searching opportunities to stop for larger β.
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Figure 6.5: these blue lines depicts the value function HL∗ for different dis-
count parameters β = 4, 5, 7 from top to bottom; the red dashed line represents
g(x);(µ, σ,K, c) = (3, 2, 1, 1); the optimal stopping threshold is indicated by the
crosspoint of each blue line with the red dashedline in (a)
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Figure 6.6: the optimal control Λ∗ under different discounting factors.
Drift coefficient µ
We can see from Figure 6.7 that the value function HL∗ and the optimal stopping
threshold L∗ are getting smaller as drift coefficient decreases. Figure 6.8 shows that
the agent spends more efforts on searching (choosing larger rate for Poisson process)
given a smaller drift coefficient. Hence, this is consistent with our intuition that the
impact of a drift coefficient leads to the opposite direction compared with that of a
discount factor.
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Figure 6.7: these solid lines depict the value function HL∗for different drift coeffi-
cient µ = 4, 3, 1 from top to bottom; the dashed line represents g(x); (β, σ,K, c) =
(5, 2, 1, 1); the optimal stopping threshold is indicated by the crosspoint of each solid
line with the dashed line.
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Figure 6.8: the optimal control Λ∗ under different drift coefficients.
Volatility coefficient σ
We can see from Figure 6.9 that the value function HL∗ and the optimal stopping
threshold L∗ are getting larger as volatility increases. This is consistent with the
intuition that larger volatility the underlying process has, the more valuable the
option is, which results from the convexity of the option payoff; Figure 6.10 shows
that the agent spends more efforts on searching (choosing larger rate for Poisson
process) given a smaller volatility. This phenomenon is due to the fact smaller
volatility implies continuing is less valuable. The agent has incentive to spend more
efforts on searching opportunities to stop.
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Figure 6.9: these solid lines depicts the value function HL∗ for different volatility
σ = 4, 2, 0.5 from top to bottom; the dashed line represents g(x); (β, µ,K, c) =
(5, 3, 1, 1); the optimal stopping threshold is indicated by the crosspoint of each
solid line with the dashed line.
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Figure 6.10: the optimal control Λ∗ under different volatility coefficients.
We discuss the cases of a > 0 and b > 0 in Section 6.6.
6.4.3 Verification
In this section we show that the heuristics are correct, and that the value to the
stochastic problem is given by the appropriate solution of the differential equation.
Although the details are different, the structure of the proof follows Dupuis and
Wang (2005).
Suppose, as throughout, that X is exponential Brownian motion with µ < β and
g is of linear growth.
Definition 1. (τ,Λ) is admissible if Λ is a non-negative, I-valued, adapted process
and τ ∈ T (TΛ).
Note that a consequence of the definition is that we insist that τ ≤ TΛ∞ := limn TΛn .
Moreover, we may have Tk =∞: in this case we may take τ =∞, whence we have
e−βτg(Xτ ) = 0 noting that limt↑∞ e
−βtg(Xt) = 0 almost surely.






Clearly, if (τ,Λ) is integrable, then (TΛ1 ,Λ) is integrable.
Lemma 13. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to
LXG− βG− C̃((g −G)+) = 0, (6.11)
and suppose that G is of at most linear growth. Set G0 = G ∨ g.













Proof. Since g and G are of linear growth we may assume G0(x) ≤ κ0 + κ1x for
some constants κi ∈ (0,∞).









Fs = F (g(Xs), G(Xs),Λs) := (g(Xs)−G(Xs))+Λs+ C̃((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) ≤ C(Λs).






















′(Xs)dWs. Our hypotheses on G allow us to con-
clude that N = (Nt)t≥0 is a martingale.



































SinceX is geometric Brownian motion and β > µ we have thatXβ,∗ := supu≥0{e−βuXu}
is in L1. Then
e−βt−
∫ t




























































Then, by Fubini’s theorem, we obtain (6.12).
Lemma 14. Let (τ,Λ) be an integrable strategy. Define Y = (Yn)n≥0 by
Yn = e




where TΛ0 = 0. Define Gn = FTΛn and set G = (Gn)n≥0.
Then Y is a uniformly integrable (Gn)n≥0-supermartingale.
Proof. We have




Moreover, on TΛn−1 < ∞ and τ > TΛn−1, writing T̃ as shorthand for TΛn − TΛn−1 and































Proposition 7. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to (6.11) of at most linear
growth. Then H ≤ G.
Proof. Let (τ,Λ) be any integrable strategy.
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Moreover, since Y is a uniformly integrable supermartingale,















Taking a supremum over stopping times and rate processes we conclude that H(x) ≤
G(x) (recall (6.2)) .
Our goal now is to show that H = G. We prove this result, first in the simplest
case where the set of admissible rate processes is unrestricted (i.e. Λt takes values
in I = [0,∞) and the cost function C is lower semi-continuous and convex, with
limλ↑∞C(λ)/λ =∞). Then we argue that the same result holds true under weaker
assumptions. Note that we allow for {λ ∈ I : C(λ) =∞} to be non-empty, but our
assumption that C is lower semi-continuous means that if λ̌ = inf{λ : C(λ) = ∞}
then C(λ̌) = limλ↑λ̌C(λ).
Theorem 10. Suppose I = [0,∞) and C : I 7→ [0,∞] is increasing, convex and
lower semi-continuous with limλ↑∞C(λ)/λ = ∞. Let G be an increasing, convex
solution to (6.11) of at most linear growth. Then H = G.
Proof. Let C ′ denote the right-derivative of C. Since limλ↑∞C(λ)/λ = ∞, we set
C ′ = ∞ on {λ : C(λ) = ∞}. Since C ′ is increasing it has a left-continuous inverse
D : R+ 7→ R+. In particular, D(y) = sup{λ ∈ [0,∞) : C ′(λ) < y} with the
convention that D(y) = 0 if C ′(λ) ≥ y on (0,∞). We note that our hypotheses
mean that D is well defined and finite on (0,∞) and we set D(0) = 0.
Let Λ̂ = (Λ̂s)s≥0 be given by Λ̂s = D((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+). We will show that Λ̂ is
the optimal rate process.
Note first that there is equality in (6.13), and therefore in (6.12), provided Fs =
F (g(Xs), G(Xs),Λs) = (g(Xs)−G(Xs))+Λs + C̃((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) = C(Λs). This
is satisfied if Λs = Λ̂s.
Let X> = {x : g(x) > G(x)} and let X≤ = {x : g(x) ≤ G(x)}. Then, under the
hypothesis of the theorem, whilst X· ∈ X≤ we have that Λ̂· ≡ 0. Hence (almost
surely) X
T Λ̂1
∈ X> and G0(XT Λ̂1 ) = g(XT Λ̂1 ). Then, taking T = T
Λ̂


















and hence, combining with Proposition 7, G = H.
Corollary 5. Λ∗ = (Λ∗s)s≥0 given by Λ
∗
s = D((g(Xs) − G(Xs))+) is an optimal
strategy where D(y) = sup{λ ∈ [0,∞) : C ′(λ) < y}, and τ∗ = TΛ∗1 is an optimal
stopping rule.
Our goal now is to extend Theorem 10 to allow for more general admissibility sets
and cost functions.
Let c be a generic increasing, convex function c : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞]. If c takes
the value +∞ on (λ̌,∞) then we assume that c(λ̌) = limλ↑∞ c(λ) = c(∞), and
set the right-derivative c′ equal to infinity on (λ̌,∞) also. For such a c define
Dc : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] by Dc(y) = sup{λ ∈ (0,∞) : c′(λ) < y} again with the
conventions that Dc(y) = 0 if c
′(λ) ≥ y on (0,∞) and Dc(0) = 0. Note that
Dc(y) ≤ sup{y : c(y) <∞}.
Let I with endpoints {λ, λ} be a subinterval of [0,∞) with the property that I is
closed on the left and closed on the right if λ <∞.
Let γ : I 7→ R+ be an increasing function. Let γ̆ be the largest convex minorant
of γ on I. Then define γ† by γ†(λ) = γ(λ) on [0, λ) (if this interval is non-empty),
γ†(λ) = γ̆(λ) on [λ, λ] and γ† =∞ on (λ,∞). By construction γ† : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞]
is convex and we can define Dγ† .
Suppose that C : I 7→ R+ is our increasing, lower semi-continuous cost function.
Introduce C† : R+ 7→ [0,∞] and DC† which we abbreviate to D†. Note that if
D†(z) < λ then z = 0, D†(z) = 0 and C†(0) = C†(λ) = C(λ). Summarising the
important results we have:
Lemma 15. C̃ = C̃†. Moreover, for z ∈ [0,∞), C((D†(z) ∨ λ) ∧ λ) = C†(D†(z)).
Theorem 11. Suppose I ⊆ [0,∞) and let C : I 7→ R be increasing, lower semi-
continuous and such that limλ↑∞
C(λ)
λ =∞. Let G be an increasing, convex solution
of (6.11) and suppose G is of linear growth. Then H = G.
Proof. Introduce C†, defined from C as above, and let H† be the solution of the
unrestricted problem (ie I† = [0,∞)) with (convex) cost function C†. Note that
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since C̃ = C̃† we have by Theorem 10 that H† = G. It remains to show that
H = H†.
The inequality H ≤ H† is straight-forward: if (τ,Λ) is admissible for the interval
I and integrable for cost function C, then it is admissible for the interval [0,∞) and
integrable for cost function C†; moreover C ≥ C†, and so H ≤ H†.
For the converse, let Λ† = D†((g(Xs) − G(Xs))+) and τ † = TΛ
†
1 be optimal for










Define Λ∗ = λ ∨ Λ† and τ∗ = τ †. Then, by Lemma 15,
C(Λ∗s) = C((D
†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+)∨λ)∧λ) = C†(D†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+)) = C†(Λ†s).












Remark 4. Note that Λ∗ ≥ Λ† and we may have strict inequality if λ > 0. In that
case, when g(Xs) ≤ G(Xs) we have Λ†s = 0, but Λ∗s = λ. In particular, we may have
τ∗ > TΛ
∗
1 , and the agent does not sell at the first opportunity. See Section 6.6.3.
6.5 Concave cost functions
In this section we provide a complementary result to Theorem 10 by considering a
concave cost function C (defined on I = [0,∞)).
Suppose C is increasing and concave on [0,∞). Then the greatest convex minorant
C̆ of C is of the form
C̆(λ) = δ + ελ
for some constants δ, ε ∈ [0,∞). Then, C and C̆ have the same concave conjugates
given by C̃(z) := infλ>0{C(λ)− λz} where C̃(z) = δ for z ≤ ε and C̃(z) = −∞ for
z > ε.
Recall that g = (x−K)+. From the heuristics section we expect the value function
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to solve (6.4). Then we might expect that on g −H < ε we have
LXH − βH − δ = 0. (6.14)
On the other hand some care is needed to interpret LXH − βH = C̃((g −H)+) on
the set g − H > ε. In fact, as we argue in the following theorem, H ≥ g − ε and












Recall from Section 6.2.1 that the continuation region and stopping region of wK,ε,δ
are C and S respectively. The intuition is that when H > g − ε it is optimal to
wait and to take Λ = 0 at cost δ per unit time on C. However, on H < g − ε (and
also when H = g − ε) it is optimal to take Λ as large as possible on S. Since there
is no upper bound on Λ, this corresponds to taking Λ infinite — such a choice is
inadmissible but can be approximated with ever larger finite values. Then, in the
region where the agent wants to stop, if the stopping rate is large, say N , then the
expected time to stop is N−1, the cost incurred per unit time is C(N) ≈ δ + εN ,
and so the expected total cost of stopping is approximately δ+εNN ≈ ε. Effectively
the agent can choose to sell (almost) instantaneously, for a fee or fixed transaction
cost of ε. This explains why the problem value is the same as the problem value for
(6.15).
Theorem 12. Let I = [0,∞) and let C : I 7→ R+ be non-negative, increasing and
concave. Suppose the greatest convex minorant C̆ of C(λ) is of the form C̆(λ) =
δ + ελ for non-negative constants δ and ε.
Then H(x) = wK,ε,δ(x). The optimal strategy is to choose Λ
∗
s = 0 when Xs ∈ C;
choose Λ∗s =∞ when Xs ∈ S and stop immediately.
Proof. First we show that for any integrable τ and Λ
Ex
[






Then we show that there is a sequence of admissible strategies for which the value
function converges to this upper bound.
We prove the result in the case ε ≥ δ/β when the cost of taking Λ = 0 is small
relative to the proportional cost C(λ)/λ associated with taking Λ large. The proof
in the case ε < δ/β is similar, but slightly more complicated in certain verification
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steps, because the explicit form of wK,ε,δ is not so tractable.
When ε ≥ δ/β we have that w = wK,ε,δ is given by
w(x) =
{
Axθ − δβ x ∈ C
(x−K − ε) x ∈ S
,
where C = (0, L) and S = [l,∞), L = β(K+ε)−δβ
θ
θ−1 and A =
1
θL
1−θ. Let w0(x) =




β−µ and L >
β(K+ε)−δ
β−µ .

















′(Xs)dWs. Then N = (Nt)t≥0 is a martingale
and





LXw − (β + Λt)w + Λtw0 − C(Λt)
]
dt. (6.16)








since w0 ≤ w + ε. Similarly, on (L,∞), w(x) = (x −K) − ε and since L > K + ε,
(6.16) yields
dMΛt ≤ dNt + e−
∫ t
0 (β+Λs)ds[µXt − (β + Λ)(Xt −K − ε) + Λt(Xt −K)− (δ + εΛt)]dt
= dNt + e
−
∫ t
0 (β+Λs)ds[(µ− β)(Xt − L) + (µ− β)L+ β(K + ε)− δ]dt ≤ dNt.
Putting the two cases together we see that MΛ is a supermartingale for any strategy
Λ.
The rest of the proof that H ≤ w follows exactly as in the the proofs of Lemma 13,
Lemma 14 and Proposition 7, with w replacing G.
Now we show that there is a sequence of strategies for which the value function
converges to w = wK,ε,δ. Since δ + ελ is the largest convex minorant of C there
exists (λn)n≥1 with λn ↑ ∞ such that C(λn)λn → ε.
Consider first the strategy of a constant rate of search λn, with stopping at the













































and H̃n(x)→ x−K − ε as n ↑ ∞. Suppose ε ≥ δ/β. Let L = β(K+ε)−δβ
θ
θ−1 and let
τL = inf{u : Xu ≥ L}. Consider the strategy with rate Λ̂n = λnI{t≥τL}, for which
selling occurs at the first event time of the Poisson process with this rate, and let
Ĥn be the value function associated with this strategy.
For x ≥ L we have Ĥn(x) = H̃n(x)→ x−K − ε = wK,ε,δ(x).































where the last line follows from the definition of L and some algebra.
6.5.1 An example
In this example we consider a cost function of the form C(λ) =
√
λ. Then a
(plausibly) good strategy is to take Λt = 0 if Xt < L
∗ = θθ−1 and Λt very large
otherwise. It is immediate that the value function H satisfies H ≤ w; conversely, it
is clear from Figure 6.11 that there exist strategies for which the value function is
arbitrarily close to w.
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Figure 6.11: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 3, 1); the highest line is w = wK,0,0, and the other
lines are the value functions under the rate function Λn(x) = nI{x≥L∗}.
6.6 Numerical analysis on further examples
6.6.1 Addition of a linear cost
Let C0 be a convex, lower semi-continuous, increasing cost function, and consider
the impact of adding a linear cost to C0; in particular, let Cb : R+ 7→ R+ be given
by Cb(λ) = C0(λ) + λb for b > 0.
Then the concave conjugates are such that C̃b(z) = C̃0((z − b)+).
Suppose further that G, the solution of (6.11) of linear growth, is such that G ≥ 0
on R+. The problem solution in the case of a purely quadratic cost function (recall
Section 6.4.2) has this property. Then
({(x−K)+ −G}+ − b)+ = {(x− (K + b))+ −G}+.
It follows that
C̃b({(x−K)+−G}+) = C̃0(({(x−K)+−G}+− b)+) = C̃0({(x− (K+ b))+−G}+)
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and then that the value function for a payoff (x − K)+ with cost function Cb is
identical to the value function for a cost function C0(x) but with modified payoff
(x− (K + b))+.
Note that we see a similar result in the expansion (6.9) for G in the large x regime.
6.6.2 Quadratic costs with positive fixed cost
In this section we seek to generalise the results of Section 6.4.2 on purely quadratic
cost functions to other quadratic cost functions. In view of the results in Section 6.6.1
the focus is on adding a positive intercept term, rather than a linear cost. Indeed
the focus is on cost functions of the form C(λ) = a+ c2λ
2 for a > 0.
In this section we will take a and c fixed and compare the cost fucntions C0(λ) =
c
2λ
2, C1(λ) = a+
c
2λ
2 and C>(λ) = aI{λ>0} +
c
2λ
2. The difference between the last
two cases is that in the final case, not searching at all incurs zero cost, whereas in
the middle case, there is a fixed cost which applies irrespective of whether there is
a positive rate of searching for offers or not.









There is a threshold L with L > K, such that H0 > g on (0, L) and H0 < g
on (L,∞). On (0, L) we have that H0(x) = (L − K) x
θ
Lθ




2 subject to initial conditions H0(L) = (L−K)
and H ′0(L) = θ
L−K
L . We adjust L until we find a solution for which H0 is of linear
growth at infinity.
Now consider C1 with asscoiated value function H1. When X is very small, there
is little prospect of X ever rising above K. Nonetheless the agent faces a fixed cost,
even if she does not search for offers. It will be cheaper to search for offers, because
although the payoff is zero when a candidate purchaser is found, it is then possible
in our model to stop paying the fixed cost.
Suppose X = 0. If the agent chooses to search for buyers at rate λ then the
expected time until a buyer is found is λ−1. The expected discounted cost until a

















This is minimised by the choice λ = λ∗ where λ∗ =
√
β2 + 2ac − β and the minimal
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Then H1(0) = −h−∗ . (Another way to see this is to note that at 0 we expect
LXH1 = 0 and therefore H1(0) to solve −βh = C̃(−h) = a − h
2
2c .) Then, the value
function H1 is such that there exists ` and L with 0 < ` < K < L < ∞ such that
H1 is C
1 with H1 < 0 on (0, `), H1(x) > (x−K)+ on (`, L) and H1(x) < (x−K)+




2 x < `;
a ` < x < L;
a− 12c(g − h)
2 L < x.
See Figure 6.12. Considering H1 on (`, L) we have H1(x) = Ax
θ +Bxφ− aβ for some
constants A and B chosen so that H1(`) = 0 and H1(L) = (L−K):
A =





`−φLθ−φ aβ − `
θ−φL−φ(L−K + aβ )
Lθ−φ − `θ−φ
.
Then for general ` and L we can use value matching and smooth fit at ` and L to
construct a solution on (0,∞). Finally, we adjust ` and L until H1(0) = −h−∗ and
H1 has linear growth.
(a) The value function H1(x). (b) The optimal rate Λ
∗
1(x).
Figure 6.12: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost function is C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2. The
left figure shows the value function, and the right figure the optimal stopping rate.
There are two critical thresholds ` = `∗ and L = L∗.
In Figure 6.12 we plot the value function and optimal rate for the Poisson process
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for C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2. There are two critical thresholds `∗ and L∗ with 0 < `∗ <
K < L∗. Above L∗ the agent would like to stop in order to receive the payoff
(x −K), and is willing to expend effort to try to generate selling opportunities in
order to receive the payoff before discounting reduces the worth. Below `∗ the agent
would like to stop, even though the payoff is zero, and is willing to expend effort
to generate stopping opportunities in order to limit the costs they incur prior to
stopping. Between `∗ and L∗ the agent does not expend any effort searching for
offers and would not accept any offers which were received.
Now consider the cost function C>(λ) = aI{λ>0} +
c
2λ
2 with associated value
function H>. We have C̃>(z) = 0 for z ≤
√
2ac and C̃> = a− z
2
2c for z ≥
√
2ac. As
in the pure quadratic case, there is always the option of taking Λ ≡ 0 at zero cost,
so that the value function is non-negative. It follows that H>(0) = 0. There is a
threshold L below which the agent does not search for offers. But, this threshold
is not the boundary between the sets {x : H>(x) > g(x)} and {x : H>(x) < g(x)},
since when g(x) − H>(x) is small, it is still preferable to take Λ = 0, rather than
to incur the cost of strictly positive λ. Instead L separates the sets {x : H>(x) >
g(x) −
√
2ac} and {x : H>(x) < g(x) −
√
2ac}. We find that there is a threshold
L with L > K such that on (0, L), H> solves LXh − βh = a. At L we have
H>(L) = (L−K−
√






Then, on (L,∞), H> solves LXh − βh = a − (x−K−h)
2
2c , subject to value matching
and smooth fit conditions at x = L. Finally, we adjust the value of the threshold L
until H is of linear growth for large x.
(a) The value function H>(x) (b) The optimal rate Λ
∗
>(x)
Figure 6.13: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost function is C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ
2.
The highest convex minorant is C̆>(λ) = λ+ [(λ− 1)+]2. (Here we use the fact that√
2ac = 2.)
In Figure 6.13 we plot the value function H> and optimal rate Λ
∗
>. We see that
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Λ∗> never takes values in (0, 1) where C> > C̆>. Either it is optimal to spend a
non-negligible amount of effort on searching for candidate buyers, or it is optimal
to spend no effort.
(a) Comparison of the value functions (b) Comparison of the optimal stopping rates
Figure 6.14: (β, µ, σ) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost functions we consider are C0(λ) = λ
2,
C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ
2 and C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2. The left figure plots the value functions
under optimal behaviour, and the right figure plots the optimal rates for the Poisson




0. For small x, Λ
∗
1 > 0 = Λ
∗
> = Λ0.
Figure 6.14 compares the value functions and optimal rates for the Poisson process
for the three cost functions C0(λ) = λ
2, C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ
2 and C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2.
Since C0 ≤ C> ≤ C1 we must have that H0 ≥ H> ≥ H1 and we see that away from
x = 0 this inequality is strict. Indeed, especially for small x, H0 and H> are close
in value. The differences in optimal strategies are more marked. For large x the






1, and thus that even though
C1 > C0, the agent searches at a higher rate under C1 than under C0. Note that,
we only have Λ∗> > 0 for x above a critical value (in our case, approximately 5).
Conversely, for C1 there is a second region where Λ1 > 0, namely where x is small.
6.6.3 Cost functions defined on a subset of R+
In this section we consider the case where there is a strictly positive lower bound
on the rate at which offers are received. In fact, in our example the optimal rate of
offers takes values in a two-point set. Nonetheless, we see a rich range of behaviours.
Suppose Λ takes values in [λ, λ] where 0 < λ < λ < ∞ and suppose C : [λ, λ] 7→
R+ is increasing and concave. Introduce C̆ : [λ, λ] 7→ [0,∞) defined by C̆(λ) =
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C(λ) + λ−λ
λ−λ(C(λ)− C(λ)). Finally introduce C
† : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] by
C†(λ) =

C(λ) λ < λ,
C̆(λ) λ ≤ λ ≤ λ,
∞ λ < λ.
Write a = C(λ) and b = (C(λ)−C(λ))
λ−λ . Then C
† has concave conjugate C̃†(z) = a−λz
for z ≤ b and C̃†(z) = a− bλ− (z − b)λ for z > b.
Suppose first that C(λ) = a = 0. Then the value function H is positive, increasing
and C1 and satisfies
LXh− βh =

0 x < L,
−λ(g − h) L ≤ x ≤M,
−bλ− λ(g − h− b) M < x,
where L and M are constants satisfying 0 < K < L < M which must be found as
part of the solution, and are such that h(x) > (x−K) on (0, L), (x−K) > h(x) >
x−K − b on (L,M) and (x−K − b) > h(x) on (M,∞). See Figure 6.15.
Fix L and consider constructing a solution to the above problem with H(0)
bounded. On (0, L) we have that H(x) = Axθ + Bxφ and the requirement that
H is bounded means that B = 0 and then A = (L −K)L−θ. We then use the C1
continuity of H at L to find the constants C and D in the expression for H over
(L,M):
H(x) = Cxθ +Dxφ +
λ




Here φ, θ with φ < 0 < 1 < θ are solutions to Qλ(·) = 0 where Qλ(ψ) = 12σ
2ψ(ψ −
1) + µψ − (β + λ). In turn, we can find the value of M = M(L) where H given by
(6.17) crosses the line y(x) = x−K − b, and then value matching at M gives us the
value of E in the expression for H over [M,∞):
H(x) = Exφ +
λ
λ+ β − µ
x− (K + b)λ− bλ
λ+ β
where φ is the negative root of Qλ(·) = 0. (There is no term of the form x
θ since
H must be of linear growth at infinity.) Finally, we can solve for L by matching
derivatives of H at M .
Figure 6.15 plots the value function and the optimal rate function. The state space
splits into three regions. On x > M the asset is considerably in-the-money and the
agent is prepared to pay the cost to generate a higher rate of selling opportunities.
118
(a) The value function H. (b) The optimal rate Λ∗.
Figure 6.15: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ, C(λ), C(λ)) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10, 0, 20). Note that b =
(C(λ)−C(λ))
λ−λ = 4. The left figure plots the value function and the right figure plots
the optimal rate function. Λ is constrained to lie in [5, 10], and the cost function is
20I{λ>5}. We see that Λ
∗ takes values in {5, 10}.
When x is not quite so large, and L < x < M , the agent is not prepared to pay
this extra cost, but will sell if opportunities arise. However, if x < L then selling
opportunities will arise (we must have Λ ≥ λ) but the agent will forgo them. Ideally
the agent would choose Λ = 0, but this is not possible. Instead the agent takes
Λ = λ, but synthesises a rate of zero, by rejecting all offers.
When C(λ) > 0, the agent will not pay the fixed cost indefinitely when X is small.
The behaviour for large X is unchanged, but the agent will now stop if offers arrive
when the value of continuing is negative, including when X is near zero. There are
two cases depending on whether C(λ)λ+β ≤
C(λ)
λ+β
or otherwise. In the former case, when
X is small it is cheaper to pay the lower cost and to stop if opportunities arise,
than to pay the higher cost with the hope of stopping sooner. In the latter case, the
comparison is reversed. We find that H solves
LXh− βh = C̃((g − h)+)
subject to h(0) = −minλ∈{λ,λ}{
C(λ)
λ+β } and the fact that h is of linear growth at
infinity. The solution is smooth, except at points where C̃((g− h)+) is not differen-
tiable. This may be at K where g is not differentiable, or when g = h, or, since C̃
is non-differentiable at b, when g − h = b.





. This means that when x is small the agent expends as little effort as
possible searching for offers, although they do accept any offers which arrive. There
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is also a critical threshold M , beyond which it is optimal to put maximum effort into
searching for offers. There are then two sub-cases depending on whether costs are
small or large. If costs are large then the agent will always accept any offer which
comes along (Figure 6.16(c) and (d)). However, when costs are small (Figure 6.16(a)
and (b)), there is a region (`, L) over which h(x) > g(x) = (x −K)+. Then, as in
the region (0, L) when C(λ) = 0, even when there is an offer the agent chooses to
reject it. Effectively, the agent creates a zero rate of offers by thinning out all the
events of the Poisson process.
(a) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
1, C(λ) = 20).
(b) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
1, C(λ) = 20).
(c) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
10, C(λ) = 20).
(d) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
10, C(λ) = 20).
Figure 6.16: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10). The left panels plot the value
function and the right panels plot the optimal rate function. In each row C(λ)λ+β <
C(λ)
λ+β .
In the case of lower costs (C(λ) = 1) there is a region (`, L) where H(x) > g(x) and
the agent chooses to continue rather than to stop.








. When x is small
the agent searches at the maximum rate to generate an offer as quickly as possible.
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Necessarily H(0) < −b. If costs are large enough, then H(x) < (x− k)+ − b for all
x, see Figure 6.17(a) and (b). Then the agent wants to stop as soon as possible, and
is prepared to pay the higher cost rate in order to facilitate this. As costs decrease,
we may have (x−k)+− b ≤ H(x) for some x, whilst the inequality H(x) < (x−k)+
remains true, see Figure 6.17(c) and (d). Then there is a region (m,M) over which
the optimal strategy is Λ∗(x) = λ. The agent still accepts any offer which is made.
Finally, if costs are small enough we find that there is a neighbourhood (`, L) of K
for which H(x) > (x−K)+. Then, on (`, L) the agent takes Λ∗(x) = λ, but chooses
to continue rather than stop if any offers are made.
As a limiting special case suppose λ = λ = λ̂ and that C(λ̂) = c ∈ [0,∞). Then
there is a single threshold L to be determined and H is of the form
H(x) =
 Ax






where φ̂ is the negative root of Qλ̂(·) = 0. The value matching condition H(L) =











Then first order smooth fit at L implies that







θ − φ̂(β − µ)
λ̂+ β − µ
− λ̂
λ̂+ β − µ
}−1
.
Note that if we take c = 0 we recover exactly the expressions in Dupuis and
Wang (2005).
6.7 Conclusion
Our goal in this article is to extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang (2005) who
considered optimal stopping problems where the stopping time was constrained to
lie in the event times of a Poisson process, to allow the agent to affect the frequency
of those event times. The motivation was to model a form of illiquidity in trading
and to consider problems in which the agent can exert effort in order to increase the
opportunity set of candidate moments when the problem can terminate. This notion
of effort is different to the idea in the financial economics literature of managers
expending effort in order to change the dynamics of the underlying process, as
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(a) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
15, C(λ) = 20). b = 1.
(b) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
15, C(λ) = 20).
(c) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
5, C(λ) = 7). b = 0.4.
(d) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
5, C(λ) = 7).
(e) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
2, C(λ) = 2.5). b = 0.1.
(f) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
2, C(λ) = 2.5).
Figure 6.17: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10). The left column plots the value
function and the right column plots the optimal rate function. In each row C(λ)λ+β >
C(λ)
λ+β . Near x = 0 it is always preferable to choose the maximum possible rate
process. Costs decrease as we move down the rows.
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exemplified by Sannikov (2008) but seems appropriate for the context.
Our work focuses on optimal stopping of an exponential Brownian motion under
a perpetual call-style payoff, although it is clear given the work of Lempa (2007)
how the analysis could be extended to other diffusion processes and other payoff
functions. Nonetheless, even in this specific case we show how it is possible to
generate a rich range of possible behaviours, depending on the choice of cost function.
In our time-homogeneous, Markovian set-up, the rate of the Poisson process can be
considered as a proxy for effort, and the problem can be cast in terms of this control
variable. Then, the form of the solution depends crucially on the shape of the cost
function, as a function of the rate of the inhomogeneous Poisson process.
One important quantity is the limiting value for large λ of the average cost C(λ)λ .
If this limit is infinite, then the agent does not want to select very large rates for
the Poisson process as they are too expensive. In this case we can replace C with
its convex minorant and solve the problem for that cost function. However, if C
is concave and the set of possible values for the rate process is unbounded then
when the asset is sufficiently in the money, the agent wants to choose an infinite
rate function, and thus to generate a stopping opportunity immediately. Choosing
a very large rate function, albeit for a short time, incurs a cost equivalent to a fixed
fee for stopping, and this is reflected in the form of the value function.
Another important quantity is the value of C at zero. If a choice of zero stopping
rate is feasible and incurs zero cost per unit time, then the agent always has a
feasible, costless choice for the rate function, and the value function is non-negative.
Then, when the asset price is close to zero we expect the agent to put no effort into
searching for buyers, and to wait. However, if the cost of choosing a zero rate for
the Poisson process is strictly positive, then the agent has an incentive to search
for offers even when the asset price is small and the payoff is zero. When the agent
receives an offer they accept, because this ends their obligation to pay costs. In this
way we can have a range of optimal behaviours when the asset price is small.
When the range of possible rate processes includes zero and C is strictly increas-
ing, then the agent only exerts effort to generate selling opportunities in circum-
stances where they would accept those opportunities. The result is that the agent
stops at the first event of the Poisson process, and the optimal stopping element of
the problem is trivial. However, an interesting feature arises when there is a lower
bound on the admissible rate process. Then, the agent may receive unwanted offers,
which they choose to decline. In this case the agent chooses whether to accept the
first offer or to continue.
We model the cost function C as increasing, which seems a natural requirement of
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the problem. (However, if C is not increasing, we can introduce a largest increasing
cost function which lies below C, and the value function for that problem will match
the solution of the original problem.) We also assume that the interval of possible
values for the rate process is closed (at any finite endpoints) and that C is lower semi-
continuous. Neither of these assumptions is essential although they do simplify the
analysis. In particular, these assumptions ensure that the minimal cost is attained,
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[13] Dwenger N., Kübler D., and G. Weizsäcker, (2013), Flipping a Coin: Evidence
from Laboratory and Field, SSRN Working paper, id2353282.
[14] Durrett, R., (1991), Probability: Theory and Examples, Wadsworth, Pacific
Grove, California.
[15] Ebert, S. and P. Strack, (2015), Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in
a Dynamic Context, American Economic Review, 105(4), 1618-1633.
[16] Fudenberg, D., R. Iijima and T. Strzalecki, (2015), Stochastic choice and re-
vealed perturbed utility, Econometrica. 83 (6): 2371-2409.
[17] Fudenberg, D., P. Strack and T. Strzalecki, (2017), Speed, Accuracy and the
Optimal Timing of Choices, Working paper, Harvard University.
[18] Gul, F. ,and W. Pesendorfer, (2006), Random Expected Utility, Econometrica,
74,121-146.
[19] Guo, X and J. Liu, (2005), Stopping at the maximum of geometric Brownian
motion when signals are received, J. Appl. Probab., 43(3) p826–838.
[20] Hall, W.J., (1998), On the Skorokhod embedding theorem, Technical Report
33, Stanford University, Department of Statistics.
[21] Henderson, V., D. Hobson, and A.S.L.Tse, (2017), Randomised Strategies and
Prospect Theory in a Dynamic Context, Journal of Economic Theory, 168,
287-300.
[22] Henderson, V., D. Hobson, and M. Zeng, (2017), Optimal Stopping and the
Sufficiency of randomised Thresholds, Working paper.
[23] Henderson, V., D. Hobson, and M. Zeng, (2017), Cautious Stochastic Choice,
Optimal Stopping and Deliberate randomisation, Working paper, University of
Warwick.
[24] Henderson, V., (2012), Prospect Theory, Liquidation and the Disposition Ef-
fect, Management Science, 58, 2, February 2012, 445-460.
[25] He, X., S. Hu, J. Obloj and X.Y. Zhou, (2017), Path dependent and randomised
strategies in Barberis’ Casino Gambling model, Operations Research, 65, 1, 97-
103.
126
[26] Hey, J.D., and C. Orme, (1994), Investigating generalizations of expected utility
theory using experimental data, Econometrica, 1291-1326.
[27] Hirsch, F., C. Profetta, B. Roynette and M. Yor, (2011), Constructing self-
similar martingales via two Skorokhod embeddings, Sem. de Prob. XLIII 451-
503 LNM 2006, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
[28] Ingersoll, J.E. and L. Jin, (2013), Realization Utility with Reference-Dependent
Preferences, Review of Financial Studies, 26 (3), 723-767.
[29] Johnson, E.J. and R. Ratcliff, (2013), Computational and Process Models of De-
cision Making in Psychology and behavioural Economics, in Neutroeconomics:
Decision Making and the Brain. ed. by P.W. Glimcher and E. Fehr, Academic
Press, 35-48.
[30] Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky, (1979), Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion Under Risk, Econometrica, 46, 171-185.
[31] Karatzas, I. and S. E.Shreve, (1991), Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus.
(Second Edition), Springer.
[32] Karni, E. and Safra Z., (1990), behaviourally Consistent Optimal Stopping
Rules, Journal of Economic Theory, 51(2), 391-402.
[33] Kyle, A.S., Ou-Yang, H. and W. Xiong, (2006), Prospect Theory and Liquida-
tion Decisions, Journal of Economic Theory, 129, 273-288.
[34] Lempa, J, (2012), Optimal stopping with information constraint, Appl. Math.
Optim., 66(2) p147–173.
[35] Liang, G. and W. Wei, (2016), Optimal Switching at Poisson Random Inter-
vention Times, Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems-Series B, 21(5),
1483-1505
[36] Luce, R.D., (1959), Individual Choice behaviour: A Theoretical Analysis, Wiley,
New York.
[37] Loomes, G. and R. Sugden, (1982), Regret theory: An alternative theory of
rational choice under uncertainty, Economic Journal, 92, 805-824.
[38] Maccheroni, F., (2002), Maxmin under Risk, Economic Theory, 19, 823-831.
[39] Machina, M., (1985), Stochastic Choice Functions Generated from Determinis-
tic Preferences over Lotteries, Economic Journal, 95, 379, 575-594.
127
[40] Magnani, J., (2016), Reference-Dependent Preferences and Optimal Stopping
Decisions: A Laboratory Investigation, Working paper.
[41] McKean, H.P., (1965), Appendix: A free boundary problem for the heat equa-
tion arising from a problem in mathematical economics, Industrial Manag. Re-
view, 6 p32–39.
[42] Menaldi, J.L. and M. Robin, (2016), On Some Optimal Stopping Problems with
Constraint, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 54(5), 2650-2671
[43] Oprea, R., D. Friedman, and S.T. Anderson, (2009), Learning to wait: A lab-
oratory investigation, The Review of Economic Studies, 76(3), 1103-1124.
[44] Pedersen, J. and G. Pekir, (2001), The Azema-Yor embedding in non-singular
diffusions, Stochastic Process. Appl., 96, 305-312.
[45] Peskir, G. and A. Shiryaev, (2006), Optimal Stopping and Free-Boundary Prob-
lems, Birkhauser Verlag, Basel.
[46] Petrovski, I.G., (1966), Ordinary differential equations (Revised English Edi-
tion), Prentice-Hall, New Jersey
[47] Pham, H., (2009), Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with
Financial Applications, Springer
[48] Pham, H., and P. Tankov, (2008), A model of consumption under liquidity risk
with random trading times, Mathematical Finance, 18(4) p613–627.
[49] Quiggin, J., (1982), A Theory of Anticipated Utility, Journal of Economic
Behaviour and Organisation, 3, 323-343.
[50] Rogers, L.C.G., (2001), The Relaxed Investor and Parameter Uncertainty, Fi-
nance and Stochastics, 5, 131-154.
[51] Rogers, L.C.G. and D. Williams, (2000), Diffusions, Markov Processes and
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